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Introduction
Recently, the highest courts of two states upheld contempt convic-
tions against attorneys for the kind of conduct that occurs in virtually
every serious trial. In one, the attorney was convicted for making a mo-
mentary facial gesture of frustration that the trial judge interpreted as
disrespectful, in response to an adverse pretrial ruling in a hotly con-
tested criminal case.' In the other, the attorney was held in contempt for
his argument that his client's sentence, just announced by the trial judge,
was "totally outrageous."2 In both, the convictions were imposed imme-
diately by the same judge leveling the contempt charges, with virtually
none of the rights to a fair trial ordinarily accorded a criminal defend-
ant.3 This power to summarily punish contemptuous behavior surely
stands as one of the greatest anomalies in our entire system of law.
4
Neither contempt nor the use of summary procedures in contempt
proceedings is unusual. It is doubtful whether much more than a few
minutes go by in this country without an attorney being charged or
threatened by a judge with contempt. In Los Angeles County alone, one
public defender is held in contempt or threatened with contempt every
week.5
Although no organization or governmental body appears to main-
tain statistics on the frequency of contempt citations,6 anecdotal data7
suggests that the threat and actual use of contempt against attorneys,
particularly those representing criminal defendants, is at an all-time high
1. See In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416, cert denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3326 (1990).
2. See In re Dodson, 214 Conn. 344, 572 A.2d 328, cerL denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3326
(1990).
3. In In re Dodson, the contemnor was permitted to telephone an attorney, who immedi-
ately appeared and represented him in the contempt proceeding. Ia In this Article, the term
"summary," unless the context indicates otherwise, is used to describe any contempt in which
the full panoply of due process rights ordinarily accorded a criminal defendant are circum-
scribed. With respect to the summary contempt power generally, see Kuhns, The Summary
Contempt Power: A Critique and a New Perspective, 88 YALE L.J. 39 (1978); N. DORSEN & L.
FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT 220-30, 232-38 (1973).
4. For a discussion of the meaning of summary proceedings, see infra notes 39-44 and
accompanying text.
5. See Tasoff, Decorum v. Justice-Summary Criminal Contempt Power and Its Effect on
the Lawyer-Advocate, Jan.-Feb. BEVERLY HILLS BAR JOURNAL 11, 22 (1976).
6. I was unable to find any state or federal administrative office of the courts that collects
such information.
7. In conducting a survey for this Article, several students and I spoke with public de-
fenders' offices in every state in which such offices exist. The anecdotal data referred to in the
text derives from these conversations as well as many others with prominent criminal and civil
trial attorneys throughout the country.
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and is increasing.8 Many criminal contempts that take place in the pres-
ence of the court may be punished summarily, without affording the con-
temnor even the fundamental due process guarantees of prior notice and
a hearing. 9
Courts must have the power to enforce order and to compel compli-
ance with their authority. Orderly proceedings and obedience to the
courts' commands are essential to the proper administration of justice.
The judicial power to punish challenges to the courts' authority as crimi-
nal contempt1" derives inherently from the courts' need to ensure compli-
8. In addition to the anecdotal data mentioned above, I also engaged in a computerized
search of all criminal contempt cases in the two major computer law services. This survey
revealed a significant increase in the number of such cases, even with rough consideration
given to the increase in the number of reported cases generally, in the last two decades. More-
over, a great many contempt decisions are unreported. See infra note 13.
9. See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975); Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
10. Contempt sanctions can be civil or criminal. Civil and criminal contempt are distin-
guishable not by the conduct cited as the basis for the contempt charge, but rather by the
purpose of the sanction imposed, and, to a lesser extent, by the nature of the proceedings.
If the purpose of the contempt sanction is remedial, then an indeterminate sentence is
imposed with the purpose of coercing a contemnor to comply with a particular order of the
court. Because a civil sanction will end when the contemnor complies or agrees to comply
with the court's order, it has been said that the person imprisoned for civil contempt carries
the keys to the jail in his own pocket. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). Because
coercive contempt sanctions are viewed as equitable civil remedies, civil contempt need not be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the contemnor does not have the right to a jury trial, and
judgments are appealable in accordance with the rules applicable to civil judgments. Kuhns,
Limiting the Criminal Contempt Power: New Roles for the Prosecutor and the Grand Jury, 73
MICH. L. REv. 483, 516-17 (1975).
A criminal contempt sentence is imposed for the purpose of punishment, and to vindicate
the authority of the court, not for any remedial purpose. Thus, while a civil contempt sanction
is indeterminate, a criminal contempt sanction is determinate. As the Supreme Court ex-
plained in Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911):
[l]mprisonment for civil contempt is ordered where the defendant has refused to do
an affirmative act required by the provisions of an order which, either in form or
substance, was mandatory in its character....
On the other hand, if the defendant does that which he has been commanded
not to do, the disobedience is a thing accomplished. Imprisonment cannot undo or
remedy what has been done ... [and in such a case] imprisonment operates, not as a
remedy coercive in nature, but solely as punishment for the completed act of
disobedience.
Id. at 442-443. In at least one case, however, a criminal contempt has been punished with a
custodial sentence that is partly coercive in nature. See Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (The defendants
were convicted of criminal contempt for refusing to testify at trial despite a grant of immunity,
and sentenced to six months imprisonment. The judge made it clear, however, that if they
decided to cooperate during the period of incarceration, he would consider reducing their
sentences).
It is clear, therefore, that a civil contempt citation may arise out of a criminal trial and
vice versa. Moreover, one act, such as the violation of a court order, may be dealt with by the
imposition of civil or criminal contempt sanctions, or, theoretically if not practically, by the
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ance with their commands and to protect themselves from interference
with the process ofjustice. An independent bar, however, is equally criti-
cal to the successful functioning of our system of justice, for it is upon the
vigorous advocacy of adversaries that our judicial system primarily relies
to expose truth and achieve justice. The exercise of the contempt power
and even the potential for its exercise can have a serious chilling effect on
the vigorousness of advocacy. Indeed, the greatest danger of this kind of
Sword of Damocles "is that it hangs-not that it drops."11
If attorneys must fear that momentary antagonism, inadvertent in-
suits, and occasional lapses of decorum that inevitably result from zeal-
ous advocacy in the heat of courtroom battle might lead to their
punishment for contempt, they will have little choice but to practice a
more hesitant brand of advocacy in order to avoid such excesses and the
accompanying personal jeopardy.
The vast majority of the use of the contempt power by trial courts
goes largely unchecked. Most threats of contempt are acceded to and
few findings of contempt are appealed. 2 Even when contempt convic-
tions are appealed, many and perhaps most appellate opinions seem to be
unpublished.13 Presently, the standards governing both the limits of ac-
ceptable advocacy and the substantive scope of the contempt power are
terribly haphazard and imprecise. The statutory standards for contempt
are so broad as to be virtually meaningless, especially when the conduct
imposition of both civil and criminal sanctions. See United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 298-
99 (1947) (if the procedural requirements for criminal contempt are complied with, both a civil
and criminal contempt penalty may be imposed in the same proceeding).
11. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing de-
terrent effect of statute imposing imprecise proscriptions on speech).
12. See Brautigam, Constitutional Challenges to the Contempt Power, 60 GEo. L.J. 1513,
1525 (1972) ("Appellate decisions are infrequent, because the offending party's safest and most
economical course is to placate the judge by apology and submission." (citing Nelles, The
Summary Power to Punish for Contempt, 31 COLUM. L.R. 956, 957-58 (1931)). In addition,
attorneys sometimes are held in contempt during a trial, and then the judge rescinds the cita-
tion at the end of the proceeding. Indeed, this has happened to me. This procedure provides
an excellent method for judges to control attorneys, if counsel knows ahead of time that if she
behaves as the court desires, the conviction will be annulled.
13. I examined all of the published and unpublished opinions in the State of New Jersey
on contempt in the past ten years. During this period, the great majority of these opinions
were unpublished. Interestingly, far more of the appellate decisions reversing contempt con-
victions were unpublished while a majority of those affirming convictions were published.
Query whether the courts are consciously or unconsciously trying to convey the message that
attorneys must obey the courts, while recognizing at the same time that many abuses of the
contempt power occur and must be reversed. Although New Jersey permits the use of unpub-
lished opinions as authority if copies are provided to the court and opposing counsel, the
decisions do not constitute precedent and are not binding on any court. See N.J. COURT RULE




in question is arguably advocative or not actually disruptive. Definitions
such as "obstruction,"14 "disorderly or insolent behavior,""i "Misbehav-
ior,"16 and "insulting language" 17 do little to distinguish protected from
punishable conduct." Many states make little effort to define contempt
by statute, but only grant the power to the courts. 19 Still others actually
attempt to define contempt in part by prohibiting "contemptuous behav-
ior."20 The substantive limits placed on the contempt power by the Con-
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1966 & Supp. 1990); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 785.01(1)(b) (West
1981).
15. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (Deering 1985); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1271 (1979);
IDAHO CODE § 7-601 (1990); Mo. REV. STAT. § 476.110 (1987).
16. See N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:10-1 (1987); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4131 (Purdon
1981); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-9-102 (1980); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-32-1 (1987).
17. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-32-1 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-456 (1982).
18. A finding of obstruction of the administration of justice sufficient to sustain a con-
tempt conviction requires in many instances a fine balancing of the value of the expression at
issue to the processes ofjustice against the harm such expression might cause. As a result, it is
extremely difficult, except where the conduct in question is very egregious or actually disrup-
tive of a judicial proceeding, to determine whether such behavior is contemptuous. Thus, for
example, appellate courts have alfirmed contempt convictions for continuing to argue with the
judge after one or two warnings to cease, see State ex reL Smith v. District Court, 210 Mont.
344, 346-47, 677 P.2d 589, 591 (Mont. 1984), and have reversed convictions for excessive
argumentation after as many as seven orders to stop, including several warnings that the attor-
ney would be held in contempt. See In re Natale (N.J. App. Div., Docket No. A-1549-84T5,
decided April 30, 1986). Similarly, courts have both upheld and overturned contempt convic-
tions for an attorney's threats to refuse to obey a trial judge's order. Compare United States v.
Baldwin, 770 F.2d 1550, 1556 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (attorney's statements that he would not appear
and represent his clients on religious holidays despite court order to contrary constitute con-
tempt) with In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 235 (1962) (threats of attorney to violate direct
court order to cease a line of questioning, "until some bailiff stops us," not an obstruction of
justice).
With respect to the vagueness of the substantive standards governing the contempt power,
see generally, Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt-Part I" Charting the Boundaries of Con-
tempt: Ensuring Adequate Breathing Room for Advocacy, 65 WASH. L. REv. 751 (October
1990). In that Article, I attempt to demonstrate that the subjectivity of the contempt power
can be constrained by the recognition of various factors that can assist in exposing and balanc-
ing the tensions resulting from the conflict between the competing goals of a trial as well as the
rights and obligations of litigants and their attorneys. By clarifying whether specific advoca-
tive expression is more beneficial than destructive to justice, the point at which such expression
can be properly prohibited, and the quality of notice to attorneys, these variables also define
the contours of the breathing room that should be accorded vigorous advocacy.
19. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1-3 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-1201-2103
(1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.4611 (West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-1-17 (1972).
Statutes may, of course, rely upon common law definitions to define the scope of prohibited
conduct. See United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957). But where, as here, the common
law development of standards fails to articulate a clearer definition, that is of little avail.
20. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1271 (1979) ("A person is guilty of criminal
contempt when he engages in any of the following conduct: (1) Disorderly, contemptuous or
insolent behavior...."); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 166 (Deering 1985); ALA. CODE § 12-
1-8 (1986); IDAHO CODE § 7-601 (1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 588.01-.03 (West 1988).
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stitution are no clearer.21
Despite the fact that numerous appellate decisions purport to spec-
ify more precise standards for application of the definition of contempt,
22
the open-ended and ill-defined nature of the criteria articulated in these
opinions makes it impossible to know before the fact, except in the most
obvious instances, whether an attorney's conduct is punishable.23 This
failing has fostered idiosyncratic exercise of the contempt power by trial
judges and has contributed to the common practice by appellate courts of
extending great deference to the trial court's determination of whether an
attorney's conduct is contemptuous. In essence, the substantive scope of
the contempt power is governed largely by the personal sensibilities of
trial judges; each court is free to enforce its own erratic rules. This ad
hoc and sporadic treatment of individual instances of contempt as iso-
lated occurrences and the uncertainty surrounding the limits of contempt
necessarily results in substantial self-censorship of zealous trial represen-
tation by lawyers. The proper operation of our system of justice requires
that appropriate variables for measuring the outermost limits of vigorous
advocacy and the innermost reach of the contempt power be identified
21. Indeed, the Supreme Court has not conclusively articulated the constitutional limits
on the definition of contempt. The Court has suggested in a number of cases that the federal
statutory standard for contempt, "actual obstruction of the administration of justice," is a
constitutionally grounded limitation. See Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383 (1919); In re
Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945); In re McConnell, 370 U.S. at 233-34. At the same time,
however, in every holding in which the Court was necessarily deciding the substantive limits of
the contempt power on constitutional grounds, it has utilized an "imminent threat of obstruc-
tion" standard. See Eaton v. City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697 (1974); In re Little, 404 U.S. 553
(1972). For an argument that the correct constitutional standard is that of actual obstruction,
see Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt: The Constitutional Limits of the Contempt Power, 65
WAsH. L. REv. 506 (July 1990).
22. Some courts have promulgated interpretations limiting their state's contempt power
to address only actual obstructions, or imminent threats of obstruction. See, e.g., Ex parte
Stephenson, 89 Okla. Crim. 427, 435, 209 P.2d 515, 520 (1949) (construing contempt statute
prohibiting "disorderly or insolent behavior" to apply only to "conduct that is directed against
the dignity and authority of the court or judge acting judiciously, obstructive of the adminis-
tration of justice . . . ."); State v. Harper, 297 S.C. 257, 259-60, 376 S.E.2d 272, 274 (S.C.
1989) (statute defining contempt as "undue disturbance of [judicial] proceedings" narrowed to
actual obstruction standard). Others, however, have failed to restrict the application of the
contempt power to either of these standards. See, e.g., Ex Parte Krupps, 712 S.W.2d 144, 149-
50 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) ("criminal contempt is not restricted only to conduct that obstructs,
or tends to obstruct, the proper administration of justice"), cerL denied, 479 U.S. 1102 (1987);
Snow v. Hawkes, 183 N.C. 390, 393, 111 S.E. 621, 622 (1922) (contempt defined in accordance
with statute as conduct that tends to bring authority of court into disrespect).
23. There is nearly universal agreement that the courts have failed to define with any
specificity the line that separates protected courtroom conduct from contemptuous misbehav-
ior. See Brautigam, supra note 12, at 1526, 1529; Note, Criminal Law-Contempt-Conduct
of Attorney During Course of Trial, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 329, 343; Note, A Pragmatic Look at
Criminal Contempt and the Trial Attorney, 12 U. BALT. L. REv. 100, 101 (1982).
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and formalized, so both the bench and the bar have sufficient understand-
ing of the competing tensions to guide their behavior appropriately.24
Both substantive and procedural protections are of special impor-
tance in contempt cases because the standards for what constitutes con-
tempt as well as the initiation of contempt proceedings are, for the most
part, all controlled by one branch, the judiciary. Unlike ordinary crimi-
nal proceedings, where prosecution must be initiated by the executive
branch and crimes are defined by the legislative branch, the normal con-
trols that act as checks and balances against abusive or mistaken exercise
of the government's power to punish criminal conduct are not present.
Thus, the potential for abuse of discretion inherent in one branch's uni-
lateral control over this unique form of criminal justice25 needs to be
controlled both by restraints upon the procedures utilized in trying con-
tempt charges and by more objective standards to determine whether
conduct is contemptuous.
The issue of summary contempt was thrust into the national spot-
light by the sensational political trials of the late 1960s and early 1970s.26
Since that time, the United States Supreme Court has made some in-
roads, both procedural 27 and substantive, 28 into the courts' power to im-
24. See Raveson, supra note 18, at 778-85.
25. The lack of legislative restraint plays some role in contributing to excesses of the con-
tempt power. One branch of government, here the judiciary, is understandably reluctant to
curtail its own prerogatives. Although state legislatures and Congress can, and have, placed
substantive limits on the contempt power by somewhat restricting the definition of contempt,
see Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Power of a Legislature to Punish for Contempt,
Wis. L. REv. 268, the degree to which legislative bodies might be willing to impose and be
capable of making further inroads on the courts' nearly unbridled power is limited by several
factors. First, separation of power considerations may prevent legislatures from imposing too
narrow a definition of contempt upon the courts' inherent authority. See infra notes 137-39.
Second, legislatures possess their own inherent power to punish for contempt. See Marshall v.
Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 541 (1917). See generally Note, supra. Thus, legislatures may legiti-
mately believe that any restrictions they might impose on the judicial contempt power will be
reflected back, and perhaps magnified, when the courts look to the constitutional limits of the
legislative power of contempt. Most important, however, is the fact that even where legisla-
tures have acted to restrict the judicial power of contempt, the standards for measuring con-
temptuous conduct necessarily are imprecise and open to broad interpretation by the courts.
See supra note 18.
26. See In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345
(7th Cir. 1972). In addition, many of the earlier significant contempt cases arose from "polit-
ical" trials. See, e.g., Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952) (Smith Act prosecutions in
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)).
27. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965) (reversing summary contempt
conviction of witness on ground that delay necessary for hearing would not obstruct grand
jury proceedings); Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971) (judge involved with contemnor
on unrelated matter could not, consistent with due process, try contempt charges); Mayberry
v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (due process violated where summary conviction, after
trial ended, was imposed by judge who had become personally embroiled with contemnor
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pose summary contempt sanctions. Nevertheless, the Court has failed to
define satisfactorily either the substantive or the procedural limits of the
summary contempt power. Indeed, the Court's most recent contempt
decision seems to have retreated from its prior sensitivity to the potential
abuses of a power that permits a trial court to act simultaneously as pros-
ecutor, witness, judge, and jury, and to impose criminal sanctions for
conduct often perceived by the judge as personally insulting as well.29
State contempt decisions, of which the two previously noted are but ex-
amples, frequently grant trial judges essentially unreviewable power to
determine whether conduct is contemptuous and when it should be pun-
ished summarily.
Calls for reform have followed two basic paths. Some commenta-
tors have argued that the summary contempt power should be abolished
altogether.30 Others have focused on the denial of due process rights
attendant in the failure to provide particular procedural guarantees, such
as a hearing or the right to counsel, in summary proceedings.31 Many of
during trial); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974) (summary contempt conviction at end of
trial violated due process because judge had become personally embroiled with contemnor and
because of failure to provide notice and opportunity to be heard).
28. See, ag., In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 235 (1962) (reversing contempt conviction of
attorney, who, in response to trial court's order to refrain from asking certain questions to a
witness, announced that he "proposed to do so unless some bailiff stopped him"); In re Little,
404 U.S. 553 (1972) (per curiam) (remarks of pro se criminal defendant during summation to
jury that judge was biased against him did not constitute contempt); Eaton v. City of Tulsa,
415 U.S. 697 (1974) (per curiam) (witness who used term "chicken shit" while testifying did
not commit contempt).
29. See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975). In Wilson, the defendants were
convicted summarily of contempt for their refusal to testify during a criminal trial, despite
having been granted immunity. The Court distinguished Harris, 382 U.S. 162, on the ground
that trial courts do not have the same flexibility as grand juries to "suspend action on any one
[case], and turn to another," while the contemnor is provided notice and a hearing. Wilson,
421 U.S. at 318.
30. The Court's authorization of the use of summary procedures at all has been severely
and cogently criticized. See Kutner, Contempt Power: The Black Robe, A Proposal for Due
Process, 39 TENN. L. REv. 1 (1971); N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 238; Sedler,
The Summary Contempt Power and the Constitution: The View from Without and Within, 51
N.Y.U. L. REv. 34, 88 (1976); Comment, Counsel and Contempt, A Suggestion That the Sum-
mary Power be Eliminated, 18 DUQ. L. R.v. 289 (1980); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165,
193-94 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting) (citation omitted):
The power of a judge to inflict punishment for criminal contempt by means of a
summary proceeding stands as an anomaly in the law. In my judgment, the time has
come for a fundamental and searching reconsideration of the validity of this power
which has aptly been characterized by a State Supreme Court as "perhaps, nearest
akin to despotic power of any power existing under our form of government."
But see Hermann, Contempt: Sacrilege in the Judicial Temple-The Derivative Political Trials,
60 Ky. L.J. 565, 591-605 (1972).
31. See, e.g., Note, Taylor v. Hayes: A Case Study in the Use of the Summary Contempt
Power Against the Trial Attorney, 63 Ky. L.J. 945 (1975) (urging reform of various specific
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these commentators have accepted to varying degrees the necessity for
summary contempt proceedings and have sought to restrain the use of
the power to a limited set of exceptional circumstances.32 The severely
limited reform that has come from the courts also has tended to respond
in piecemeal fashion to the due process deprivations caused by the cur-
tailment of one or another specific procedural guarantees.33 Other than
suggesting outright repeal, however, neither the literature nor the courts
have offered meaningful alternatives for ameliorating the draconian na-
ture of the summary contempt power.
This Article suggests a new proposal, less radical than abolition of
the summary contempt power, to improve the effectiveness of that power
and to provide protection against its misuse. The Article recommends
that appellate courts should independently review trial court findings of
adjudicative fact in appeals of contempt convictions, and even findings of
historical facts where the contempt was tried summarily. Although de
novo review is not always a wholly adequate replacement for procedural
due process at the original contempt hearing, it can compensate for most
of the deficiencies associated with summary proceedings and offers great
hope for the evolution of appropriate substantive limitations on the
power of contempt. Indeed, in some circumstances, de novo review may
even provide greater protection against abuse of the summary contempt
power than if the contemnor were accorded a plenary hearing in the first
instance.
I. The Independence and Interdependence of Substance and
Procedure in the Law of Contempt
When conduct forming the basis of a contempt charge does not oc-
cur in open court and in the presence of the judge,34 an alleged contem-
curtailments of due process rights in summary contempt proceedings); Kuhns, supra note 3
(same); Note, Constitutional Law: The Supreme Court Constructs a Limited Right to Trial by
Jury for Federal Criminal Contemnors, 1967 DuKE L.J. 632.
32. See Note, The Role of Due Process in Summary Contempt Proceedings, 68 IOWA L.
REV. 176 (1982); Kuhns, supra note 3.
33. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Abrams, 461 Pa. 327, 336 A.2d 308 (1975) (extending a
constitutional right to counsel to a contemnor in summary proceedings where a custodial sen-
tence is imposed); Commonwealth v. Crawford, 466 Pa. 269, 352 A.2d 52 (1976) (same); see
also cases cited supra note 27.
34. Contempts have traditionally been classified as either direct or indirect. Direct con-
tempt is contempt which takes place in the actual presence of the court, such that a judge can
determine through his or her own senses that it is offensive. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948); Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307 (1888). Indirect contempt is rarely defined indepen-
dently; it has been described as being "composed of all contempts that are not direct." R.
GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 70 (1963). This distinction is crucial because only direct
contempts may be disposed of summarily, while indirect contempts will always require notice
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nor is entitled to most of the procedural due process protections
applicable to ordinary3" criminal prosecutions. 6 The United States
Supreme Court has determined, conversely, that some categories of con-
tempt which occur in the presence of the court may be adjudged summa-
rily, without affording the contemnor the most basic due process rights
to a fair trial. The Supreme Court has relied on two independent justifi-
cations for the summary imposition of criminal penalties, both of which
must be present to permit the utilization of summary proceedings. First,
immediate punishment without the delay inevitably caused by plenary
proceedings is necessary to prevent and punish serious disruptions of the
courts' business and to vindicate the courts' dignity or authority.37 Sec-
ond, because the contemptuous acts occur in the judge's sight, a hearing
may not be necessary to adjudicate the facts.38 Where both criteria are
met, the Court has authorized the instantaneous infliction of contempt
sanctions by the offended judge. In a summary contempt proceeding, the
contemnor is without the benefit of an impartial fact-finder or jury,3 9 is
and a hearing replete with the due process protections normally accorded criminal defendants.
See, eg., FED. R. CRiM. P. 42(a) (allowing summary procedures only if "the judge certifies
that he saw or heard conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the
actual presence of the court"). The justification for the distinction in procedures is that unless
the judge witnesses all of the events comprising the contemptuous act, she is not in a position
to decide the matter without an evidentiary hearing.
Although this categorical distinction may seem obvious and unequivocal, this issue has
been litigated frequently because of the difficulty of categorizing various hybrid situations, the
most common of which is an attorney's absence from the courtroom. Compare In re Allis, 531
F.2d 1391 (9th Cir.) (mere absence from courtroom is not contempt), cert denied, 429 U.S.
900 (1976) and United States v. Delahanty, 488 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1973) (attorney's unex-
plained absence from pre-trial conference could not be tried summarily as it did not occur in
the actual presence of the court) with Chula v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 199, 368 P.2d 107,
18 Cal. Rptr. 507 (1962) (attorney's absence held to be direct contempt warranting summary
punishment) and In re Brown, 320 A.2d 92 (D.C. 1974) (same).
35. Although criminal contempts are not considered "crimes" for purposes of determin-
ing the defendant's procedural rights in a contempt proceeding, the Supreme Court has never-
theless recognized that "criminal contempt is a crime in every fundamental respect." Bloom v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
36. See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (if conduct occurs outside the immediate
presence of judge in court, ordinary criminal due process protections must be afforded contem-
nor); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925) (same).
37. See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 316 (1975); Cooke, 267 U.S. at 534-36.
38. See Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 9 (1952); Cooke, 267 U.S. at 534-36.
39. In Bloom, 391 U.S. 194, the Court held that the constitutional guarantees of trial by
jury applied to serious criminal contempts. A companion case to Bloom, Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968), extended the right to jury trial for serious criminal cases, including con-
tempts, to state courts. Although Bloom suggested that the right to jury trial applied to direct
contempts, Bloom, 391 U.S. at 209-10, the case itself involved only an indirect criminal con-
tempt. In Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974), the Court held that the constitu-
tional right to jury trial applied to direct contempts. Codispoti realfirmed the rule in Bloom
that only serious criminal contempts constitutionally required jury trials and that the serious-
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denied the right to counsel," and does not have notice and sufficient time
to prepare a defense,4 which generally includes the opportunity to speak
to potential witnesses and to research the law, as well as to regain compo-
sure. Indeed, at a summary hearing the contemnor does not even have
the right to present a defense or cross-examine principal witnesses, in-
cluding, if necessary, the trial judge. The only basic guarantees retained
by the contemnor in these abbreviated hearings are the right to be pre-
sumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,42 the
right to have the required wrongful intent proven beyond a reasonable
doubt,43 and generally, the guarantee of some sort of allocution,' 4 the
right to address the court prior to sentencing.
ness of the contempt should be judged by the maximum statutory penalty provided for con-
tempt or, in its absence, the actual sentence imposed. The Court also set a precise standard to
distinguish petty from serious contempts: only contempts with a penalty of greater than six
months were deemed serious. Id. at 512. Finally, Codispoti held that for purposes of deter-
mining whether the contempt was serious, consecutive sentences meted out for contempts
must be aggregated; a jury trial is required if individual sentences, summarily imposed after
completion of the trial, total more than six months, even though no sentence exceeding six
months was imposed for any single act of contempt. Id. at 516-17. Summary contempt con-
victions, however, are not only imposed during trials exempt from the aggregation rule, but
also where summary convictions that in their aggregate total more than six months are im-
posed after a trial, the trial judge can later amend her judgment (even during the pendency of
an appeal) to reduce the contempt sentences to six months or less and change consecutive to
concurrent sentences in order to evade retrial of the contempts before a jury. See Taylor v.
Hayes, 418 U.S. 506 (1973). Thus, the right to jury trial may still be subject to significant
evisceration in contempt cases.
40. Some states, however, have extended the constitutional right to counsel to a contem-
nor in summary proceedings where a custodial sentence is imposed. See Commonwealth v.
Abrams, 461 Pa. 327, 336 A.2d 308 (1975); Commonwealth v. Crawford, 466 Pa. 269, 352
A.2d 52 (1976); Pitts v. State, 421 A.2d 901 (Del. 1980).
41. See, e.g., Wilson, 421 U.S. at 318 (sometimes notice is not possible as courts do not
have the flexibility to suspend action on one case in order to turn to another); Exparte Terry,
128 U.S. 289 (1888) (no notice, hearing or impartial judge required where contempt in pres-
ence of court). See generally Kuhns, supra note 3; Sedler, supra note 30.
42. See United States v. Turner, 812 F.2d 1552, 1563 (11th Cir. 1987).
43. See Falstaff Brewing Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 702 F.2d 770, 782 (9th Cir. 1983)
("In criminal contempt willful disobedience must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.").
44. See, eg., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(1) ("Before imposing sentence the court shall afford
counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant and shall address the defendant
personally and ask him if he wishes to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any
information in mitigation of punishment."); Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496, 504-05 (1972)
(even where the judge summarily punishes contemptuous conduct, it is customary to give the
contemnor the right to address the court before sentencing); United States v. Brannon, 546
F.2d 1242, 1249 (5th Cir. 1977) (suggesting in dictum that courts adopt recommendation by
American Bar Association that contemnor convicted summarily should always be guaranteed
right of allocution (citing ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE
FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE § 7.4 (1972))). But see Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424,
428-29 (1962) (failure to afford right of allocution to defendant is not denial of due process, at
least in absence of showing that failure was prejudicial or not inadvertent).
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Because of the extraordinary lack of procedural safeguards afforded
an individual who is summarily convicted of contempt, it is natural to
look to reinstitute those protections to guard against the chilling effect on
advocacy that results from abusive or mistaken exercise of the contempt
power. In other contexts, courts have crafted novel procedural protec-
tions to vindicate favored rights.45 Procedural safeguards against im-
proper contempt citations and threats of contempt are in fact critical to
the realization of vigorous advocacy. But the importance of such protec-
tion has too often been emphasized when discussing the contempt power,
at the expense of the independent development of substantive safeguards.
For example, one of the most insightful articles on contempt not only
gives short shrift to the issue of substantive limitations, but also goes so
far as to suggest that the benefits that could be achieved by narrowing the
definition of contempt would be better accomplished by the provision of
greater procedural rights, namely entitlement to a plenary hearing, prior
to being convicted of contempt.46
Professor Kuhns is of course correct that the right to a hearing, like
other procedural safeguards, constrains the arbitrariness of the contempt
power and thereby reduces its potential to deter aggressive advocacy.
But procedural protections do nothing whatsoever to address the actual
limitations that contempt cases impose upon advocacy. Procedural pro-
tections do not provide any guidance to attorneys as to what conduct is
permissible or perhaps excusable in the course of representing their cli-
ents. Just as the special procedural safeguards created to provide height-
ened protection to first amendment values47 do not decrease the need for
the substantive development of the normative values embodied by that
constitutional right, neither do procedural protections against excessive
use of the contempt power obviate the need for limiting that power's
incursions upon legitimate advocacy. To accomplish that goal, we must
have a much finer development of the definition of contempt and a far
greater understanding of the types and degree of advocacy that are per-
missible and laudatory.
Moreover, it may be particularly inappropriate, in the context of
contempt, to rely upon procedures to substitute for substantive safe-
guards. One of the greatest problems associated with contempt is the
very lack of procedural rights afforded contemnors in summary proceed-
45. See Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REv. 579, 585-86 (1984)
(noting special procedural safeguards surrounding First Amendment, and Eighth Amendment
in death penalty cases); Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARV. L. REv. 518
(1970).
46. Kuhns, supra note 3, at 68-69.
47. See supra note 45.
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ings. That the courts readily embrace such proceedings is a pernicious
singularity in American jurisprudence and beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle to address. But until procedural regularity is accepted as the norm
and not the exception in the adjudication of contempt, we cannot look to
procedural safeguards to defend and encourage vigorous advocacy in
place of substantive restrictions on the definition of contempt. In fact,
given the prevalence of summary contempt proceedings, the need for
substantive limits on the contempt power is even more urgent to compen-
sate for the watered rights that pass for due process in such hearings.
In that sense, the substantive and procedural protections against ex-
cessive use of the contempt power may not be so much discrete divisible
safeguards as they are together a synergism: a system of safeguards that
effectuate a constitutionally required degree of fairness of which each is
individually incapable.48 To the extent that one of these protections is
diminished, the others become more important. For example, the
broader or more vague the definition of contempt, the more critical the
procedural protections against misuse of the contempt power. Similarly,
as noted above, any curtailment of procedural due process in a contempt
proceeding increases the necessity for substantive limitations on the
courts' exercise of the contempt power. Thus, regardless of how narrow
the definition of contempt might be drawn, without the right to prepare a
defense, a full opportunity to be heard before an impartial court, or the
representation of counsel, the contempt power will still chill advocacy
because attorneys cannot rely on the proper application of the definition.
Further, the remedy for violations of procedural rights at a con-
tempt hearing is only a remand for a new hearing with the procedural
protections restored. Thus, if reliance is placed solely, or even primarily,
on procedural safeguards, the prospect of facing a retrial in which the
contemnor's conduct will be reassessed against a loose substantive stan-
dard can undercut the bar's sense of whatever security or independence is
provided by the procedural protections.49
48. This interrelationship between substance and procedure also exists to a great extent in
other areas of the law, and has recently been explored by a number of scholars. See, eg.,
Matheson, Procedure in Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the First Amendment,
66 TEX. L. Rlv. 215, 223 (1987) ("To speak of procedural and substantive rules as if each can
be defined independently of the other is inaccurate. Law is the product of interaction between
substance and procedure, but the relationship between the two is more subtle and complex
than simply their joinder in litigation."); see also Risinger, "Substance" and "Procedure" Re-
visited with Some Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of "Irrebuttable Presumptions,"
30 UCLA L. REv. 189 (1982).
49. On the other hand, if plenary proceedings are provided originally in trial court con-
tempt hearings, presumably fewer convictions will result, even in the absence of stricter con-
straints on the definition of contempt. Obviously, then, fuller procedural protections would
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The functions of procedural and substantive safeguards against ex-
cesses of the contempt power are of independent importance. Yet, there
is also a symbiotic relationship between the two. Each not only supports
the other, but also each may be necessary to fulfill the other. To begin
with, because we must essentially rely on the courts themselves to define
advocacy and contempt and to limit the substantive scope of the con-
tempt power,50 procedural protections in contempt hearings are vital to
identify the substantive questions about contempt that courts should con-
sider.5  Without such procedural rights, critical substantive issues con-
cerning contempt often may not be preserved for appeal, and records
appropriate for careful appellate consideration of these issues rarely will
be created.
5 2
In addition, procedural and substantive protections against abuse of
the contempt power are connected by the commonality of the justifica-
tion for overcoming them-the imminent necessity of protecting the
court from interference with its business. That necessity provides the
only justification for bypassing the normal processes of criminal justice
both to permit a court to punish conduct and to curtail the due process
rights that ordinarily would be available in a criminal trial. When a
court determines that conduct so obstructs its processes that it is neces-
sary to punish the actor with contempt, it is easy for the court to decide
that the necessity for punishment coincides with the need for immediate
and therefore summary action. Furthermore, when a court reacts to per-
ceived misbehavior by suspending ordinary due process rights to try a
strengthen the independence of the bar and encourage more vigorous advocacy. Therefore, I
do not at all suggest that procedural safeguards are meaningless without corresponding sub-
stantive protections. Rather, the point is that both sets of safeguards are necessary to the
realization of advocacy at the outermost limits of what is and what should be permissible.
50. See Raveson, supra note 18, at 759-78.
51. It is ironic that the central dangers posed by the contempt power, the limitation and
chilling of vigorous advocacy, are greatly exacerbated by the abbreviated procedures com-
monly used to try contempt charges. Just as the threat of contempt and its actual use inhibit
what should be the full range of zealous representation, so too does the contempt power and
the curtailment of procedural rights under its auspices insulate itself from attack by limiting
the ability of advocates to defend against its power. Indeed, accused contemnors, most often
required to represent themselves in summary proceedings, are hard pressed to put up a vigor-
ous defense while the judge who leveled charges is continuing to smart, for example, from the
sting of a perceived insult. See infra note 208.
52. See infra notes 218-23. It might be said that the procedural safeguards against con-
tempt actually derive from those substantive constitutional rights safeguarding zealous repre-
sentation. Indeed, some commentators have argued that all procedural due process is not a
"free-standing" or "independent" value but a correlative of substantive constitutional guaran-
tees. See Alexander, The Relationship Between Procedural Due Process and Substantive Consti-
tutional Rights, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 323 (1987); Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive
Rights in Due Process, 18 NoMos 182 (1977).
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contempt charge summarily, it is implying a fragility of judicial processes
calling for extreme measures to protect them. That exaggerated sensitiv-
ity to the needs of the court also encourages an oversensitivity as to the
substance of what constitutes contempt.
The court's procedures and attitudes tend to ritualize the degree of
respect and obedience owed to the court. When courts embrace the use
of summary contempt proceedings they suggest that they can decide
these matters themselves, without the ordinary procedures for trials, be-
cause they cannot be mistaken either in the determination that a con-
tempt has occurred or in meting out punishment. That attitude
institutionalizes a sense of royalty about the court and commands a sort
of obeisance, the breach of which is, of course, contemptuous. If a trial
judge has the discretion to decide that the necessity for preventing inter-
ference with the court's business or vindication of the court's authority
requires the curtailment of fundamental due process rights, surely appel-
late courts must be hard pressed to decide that there was no necessity for
punishment-no contemptuous behavior-in the first instance. Thus,
permitting the trial court discretion to utilize summary procedures also
probably increases the deference appellate courts accord trial judges' de-
terminations that a contempt occurred.
Conversely, a fuller comprehension of both the substantive reach of
the contempt power and when it is necessary to punish behavior to pro-
tect the administration of justice will assist in determining when, if ever,
summary procedures are needed or appropriate. For example, to the ex-
tent that minor affronts to the dignity of the court are seen to undermine
the court's authority, it is arguable that an immediate vindication of the
court's dignity and authority through summary proceedings is necessary
to restore both.
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that I suggest that one pro-
cedural device-de novo review-holds the potential for resolving many
of the procedural and substantive difficulties surrounding the courts' use
of the contempt power. Independent review of contempt convictions
would reverse the presumption of correctness of trial court determina-
tions of contempt and allow appellate courts to develop appropriate ob-
jective standards to govern the substantive scope of the contempt power
on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, de novo review would provide a pow-
erful protection against abuse of the contempt power in summary pro-
ceedings, where the ordinary procedural safeguards associated with
criminal trials are absent.
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II. The Role of the Appellate Courts: De Novo Review
Because the substantive definition of contempt is terribly imprecise 3
and because contempts are so frequently imposed in summary proceed-
ings, the primary safeguard against trial courts' mistaken use and abuse
of the contempt power has been appellate review. Appellate review does
hold the promise of correcting individual instances of abuse 54 and of gen-
erating broadly applicable standards that can appropriately define the
limits of the contempt power and give more detailed guidance to attor-
neys, judges and other participants in the judicial process as to the scope
of permissible courtroom behavior. But as appellate review of contempt
convictions presently operates in most jurisdictions, including the federal
courts, it has achieved only passable success at the former and has been
notably ineffectual at the latter.5
It is important to recognize at the outset that appellate review is
limited as a safeguard against individual instances of abuse of the con-
tempt power for the simple reason that most contempt convictions never
reach appellate courts.5 6 In some states, appellate review of contempt
convictions is not even permitted as of right, and must be pursued by
petition for certiorari or writ of habeas corpus.5 For appellate review to
53. See Raveson, supra note 18, at 751-78 (arguing for necessity of developing clearer
substantive limits on contempt power); Raveson, supra note 21, at 506-29 (urging adoption of
more stringent constitutional standard governing exercise of summary contempt sanctions);
Brautigam, supra note 12, at 1530-33 (concluding that the existing statutes defining the courts'
contempt power are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad).
54. Numerous courts, including the Supreme Court, have expressed support for appellate
review as a sufficient safeguard against instances of abuse of the contempt power. See, e.g.,
Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 517 (1974) ("summary convictions during trial that
are unwarranted by the facts will not be invulnerable to appellate review"); Sacher v. United
States, 343 U.S. 1, 13 (1954) ("It is to be doubted whether the profession will be greatly terror-
ized by punishment of some of its members after such extended and detached consideration [by
appellate courts]."); see also AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND REc-
OMMENDATION ON DISRUPTION OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 13 (1970).
55. Professor Kuhns argues persuasively that appellate review is an inadequate safeguard
against abuse of the contempt power. See Kuhns, supra note 3, at 69-70. Kuhns asserts that
appellate review cannot provide a sufficient substitute for procedural adjudications in a sum-
mary contempt adjudication. That inadequacy has also been recognized by several federal
courts. See, eg., United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 1972) (appellate review
does not afford the same measure of protection against arbitrariness as does "measuring the
right to jury trial by the cumulative sentence imposed for contempts occurring during a single
trial.").
56. See supra note 12 and infra note 59.
57. Limitations on the right to appeal from a contempt conviction have been both legisla-
tively and judicially imposed. See In re Palmer, 265 N.C. 485, 144 S.E.2d 413 (1965); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 5-2 (1969) (a contemnor has the right to appeal from an indirect contempt but
the only appellate remedy from a finding of direct contempt is by writ of habeas corpus);
Brizendine v. State, 103 Tenn. 677, 54 S.W. 982 (1899) (if contempt is in the presence of the
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act as an effective remedy against abuses of the summary contempt
power, an appeal as of right from a conviction of contempt must be pro-
vided to at least one reviewing court." In the federal courts, and those
states that do permit direct appeals from contempt convictions, many
contempts are never appealed because the effort is prohibitively expen-
sive.59 Often, charges are dismissed or fines are vacated when the con-
temnor apologizes to the offended court,' ° or the contemnor is released
from jail when he complies with the court's order.61 Even when con-
court, the only appellate remedy is by habeas corpus or petition for certiorari); Wagner v.
Warnasch, 156 Tex. 334, 339, 295 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1956) (a contempt conviction may only be
challenged by writ of habeas corpus); Bell v. Hongisto, 501 F.2d 346, 352 (9th Cir. 1974) (in
California, no direct appeal of contempt conviction; contemnor must proceed by petitioning
for writ of habeas corpus or certiorari), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975). Although some
states that permit appeals by habeas corpus proceedings only limit the scope of appellate in-
quiry to questions regarding the court's jurisdiction, the term "jurisdiction" has sometimes
been broadly construed to include questions of whether the alleged acts constitute contempt
and whether the evidence was sufficient. At least where summary proceedings were held be-
low, it is arguable that due process is violated when a state limits or denies appellate review of
a contempt conviction. Exploration of this question, however, is beyond the scope of this
Article.
58. At least where summary proceedings were held below, it is arguable that due process
is violated when a state limits or denies appellate review of a contempt conviction. Professor
Kuhns has argued for a right to appellate review of a contempt conviction, although he does
not address the standard of review that should be employed. See Kuhns, supra note 3, at 118-
19. As Professor Kuhns observes, "[Tihe absence of procedural safeguards at the adjudicatory
phase makes appellate review the most important safeguard against abuses of the summary
contempt power." Id. at 119. As noted earlier, however, Professor Kuhns apparently does not
agree that appellate courts can appropriately place substantive restraints on contempt. But for
the reasons discussed in the text, and because of the potential for de novo review, Professor
Kuhns' concerns appear to be overstated.
59. For example, if the sanctions imposed upon conviction are trivial, such as a small fine,
the time and expense of appealing the contempt may persuade many simply to endure the
penalties even where the chances for reversal on appeal are excellent. Similarly, the publicity
generated by an appeal, especially if an appellate opinion is published, might adversely affect
an attorney's career with regard to the perceptions of employers, clients, and judges.
60. In such circumstances, expediency often will triumph over the principle of pursuing
appellate remedies. See supra note 12.
61. The imposition of incarceration in civil contempt is always a coercive measure meant
to terminate when the contemnor cooperates with the court and, theoretically, is not to be
considered punishment. A jail sentence imposed after a criminal contempt conviction, how-
ever, is determinate and intended as punishment. There have been cases, however, where a
person held in criminal contempt is jailed with the express purpose of coercing cooperation
with the court, for example to testify, after the contemnor has refused to do so. See, for exam-
ple, United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975), where the Supreme Court approved the
practice of a trial judge who summarily held the defendant in contempt and imposed a six
month penalty for his refusal to testify after he was granted immunity, but made it clear that a
reduction of the sentence was possible if the defendant testified. Although the punishment
imposed in Wilson bears a strong resemblance to the coercive indeterminate sentences imposed
in civil contempt, the contempt conviction in Wilson was clearly criminal. As to the difference
between civil and criminal contempt, see supra note 10.
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tempt convictions do reach the appellate courts, review may often be an
inadequate safeguard against contempt citations that exceed substantive
limits. The ability of appellate courts to correct the erroneous imposition
of contempt sanctions by trial judges and to develop clear and appropri-
ate substantive limitations is severely hampered by the deferential stan-
dard of review utilized by most jurisdictions in appeals of contempt
convictions.
At present, different jurisdictions apply a variety of standards of re-
view in appeals of contempt sanctions. The issue of whether particular
behavior constitutes contempt has been treated at times purely as a ques-
tion of law because the conduct comprising the contempt was undis-
puted.62 In those instances, the reviewing court has been free to
elaborate on the norms underlying the contempt power and the constitu-
tional rights threatened by contempt, unfettered by any deference to the
trial court's original weighing of the competing interests. For example,
in In re McConnell,6" the Supreme Court reviewed the district court's
finding that an attorney's statements admittedly made to the court were
contemptuous." The Supreme Court reversed the trial court apparently
on the basis that it simply disagreed with its conclusion that the state-
ment constituted an obstruction of justice.6"
McConnell considered whether a single statement obstructed a judi-
cial proceeding. The Court did not discuss the setting of the particular
trial or any other facts relevant to whether an obstruction occurred.
When the Supreme Court has been faced with more complex records that
did raise these issues, at least in reviewing state court contempt convic-
tions, it sometimes has engaged in an independent review of the entire
record in order to make its own judgment of whether the conduct in
question presented a clear and present danger to the administration of
62. See In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962); see, e.g., United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d
345, 371 (7th Cir. 1972) (regardless of intent of contemnor, charges insufficient as a matter of
law because no actual material obstruction occurred); United States v. Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389
(7th Cir. 1972) (same).
63. 370 U.S. 230.
64. In response to the judge's ruling ordering the attorney to cease asking questions along
a certain line, the attorney stated, "!A97e have a right to ask questions, and we propose to do so
unless some bailiff stops us." Id at 235 (emphasis added) (quoting Parmelee Transp. Co. v.
Keeshin, 294 F.2d 310, 312, 314 (7th Cir. 1961)).
65. The Court concluded merely that:
We cannot agree that a mere statement by a lawyer of his intention to press his legal
contention until the court has a bailiff stop him can amount to an obstruction of
justice that can be punished under the limited powers of summary contempt which




At the same time, however, the Court has held that where the tran-
script of the trial court proceedings is inadequate to convey the complete
picture of the courtroom scene,67 the reviewing court must give deference
to the trial court's decision to invoke the summary contempt power. In-
deed, in its most recent contempt decision, the Court's overriding con-
cern was with preserving the discretion of the trial judge to determine
whether a contempt occurred and whether sanctions should be imposed
summarily.6 8 Circuit courts, as well, have employed various deferential
standards of review in criminal contempt cases.6 9 Although the appellate
66. The Court observed in Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373 (1947), "In a case where it
is asserted that a person has been deprived by a state court of a fundamental right secured by
the Constitution, an independent examination of the facts by this Court is often required to be
made." See also Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946) (the Court is "compelled to
examine for [itself] the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made
to see whether or not they do carry a threat of clear and present danger to the impartiality and
good order of the courts .... ").
67. Typical inadequacies of the trial record were noted by the Supreme Court in Fisher v.
Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949), "[T]he transcript of the record cannot convey to us the complete
picture of the courtroom scene. It does not depict such elements of misbehavior as expression,
manner of speaking, bearing and attitude of the petitioner. Reliance must be placed upon the
fairness and objectivity of the presiding judge." Id. at 161.
68. See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 319 (1975) (concluding that appellate
courts "can deal with abuses of discretion without restricting... [the summary contempt
power] in contradiction of its express terms, and without unduly limiting the power of the trial
judge. .. ").
69. See In re McDonald, 819 F.2d 1020 (1lth Cir. 1987) (abuse of discretion standard);
United States v. McCargo, 783 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1986) (sufficiency of the evidence is viewed
in light most favorable to government); Moore v. United States, 150 F.2d 323, 325 (10th Cir.)
(gross abuse of discretion standard), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 740 (1945); United States v.
Galanate, 298 F.2d 72, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1962) (abuse of discretion standard); In re Contempt of
Greenberg, 849 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1988) (abuse of discretion); Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973,
980 (9th Cir. 1973) ("While we have great respect for the sovereignty of the Arizona courts
and accord much weight to their decision involving contempt convictios, [a contempt convic-
tion must be reversed where] the record reveals no facts supporting the challenged contempt
conviction."), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974); United States v. Turner, 812 F.2d 1552, 1563
(11 th Cir. 1987) (whether such findings are supported by any substantial evidence).
The standard of review applied by the federal court when they are reviewing state court
contempt convictions in habeas corpus proceedings is whether any evidence appears on the
record that the acts in issue constitute contempt under state law. See Hawk v. Cardoza, 575
F.2d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1978); Weiss, 484 F.2d at 980.
With civil contempt citations, on the other hand, there is no question that the standard of
review is the "abuse of discretion" or "clearly erroneous" standard. See Afro-American Pa-
trolmen's League v. City of Atlanta, 817 F.2d 719 (1lth Cir. 1987); In re Crystal Palace Gam-
bling Hall, Inc., 817 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1987).
The trial court's determination of whether to use summary or non-summary procedures is
reviewed by the circuit courts exclusively on an abuse of discretion standard, as is the sentence
imposed for contempt. See, eg., United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.) (district
courts' exercise of summary contempt power reviewed for abuse of discretion), opinion
amended, 764 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Ray, 683 F.2d 1116 (7th Cir.) (con-
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courts of at least one state engage in full de novo consideration of the law
and the facts of summary contempt convictions,70 the great majority of
state courts review contempt findings solely for abuse of discretion.71
Appellate court deference to trial judges' findings that a contempt
was committed and that the use of summary procedures was necessary
would seem inevitably to resonate from the very core of the summary
contempt power. That is, if one accepts the twin justifications for the
exercise of that power-that summary sanctions are necessary to protect
the court's business from interference and that there is no need to hold a
hearing where the trial judge witnessed all of the events comprising the
contempt 72-then, by definition, authorization for the summary con-
tempt power assumes that the trial court is in the best position to deter-
mine fairly whether summary punishment must be imposed and
tempt sentence reviewed for abuse of discretion), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1091 (1982); United
States v. Brummit, 665 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1981) (same), cert denied, 456 U.S. 977 (1982).
Often, however, courts have not been entirely clear, in reviewing a summary contempt
conviction for abuse of discretion, whether the standard of review is being applied purely to the
trial court's decision to use summary procedures or to its substantive finding of contempt as
well. See, e.g., Wilson, 421 U.S. at 316-17 ("whether [summary contempt] is necessary in a
particular case is a matter the Rule [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a)] wisely leaves to the
discretion of the trial court"); In re McDonald, 819 F.2d at 1025 (no distinction drawn by
circuit court between standard of review for use of summary power and substantive findings).
In Moschiano v. United States, 695 F.2d 236 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 464 U.S. 831
(1983), an appeal of a summary contempt conviction, the Seventh Circuit held that:
Resort to summary disposition of criminal contempt under Rule 42(a) is permissible
only when the express requirements of the rule are met and when there is a 'compel-
ling reason for an immediate remedy' or time is of the essence. [Citations omitted].
Once the literal requirements of Rule 42(a) are satisfied, a trial court's decision to
invoke summary procedures should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. [Citation
omitted].
Id. at 251-52. Despite the fact that the court employed an abuse of discretion standard, how-
ever, it emphasized "the special duty of an appellate court to give careful and meticulous con-
sideration to the trial court's decision that summary disposition is appropriate. Id. at 252
(emphasis added).
70. See N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:10-3 (1987); N.J. COURT RULE 2:10-4 (1983).
71. See Hawk v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 3d 108, 116 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1974); Currie
v. Scwalbach, 132 Wis. 2d 29, 36, 390 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Wis. App. 1986), aff'd, 139 Wis. 2d
544, 407 N.W.2d 862 (1987); Commonwealth v. Worthy, 354 Pa. Super. 454, 512 A.2d 39
(1986); Crudup v. State, 218 Ga. 819, 130 S.E.2d 733 (1963); Mason v. Siegel, 301 Mich. 482,
484, 3 N.W.2d 851, 852 (1942); Carolina Wood Turning Co. v. Wiggins, 247 N.C. 115, 100
S.E.2d 218 (1957) (findings of fact of the trial court are upheld if supported by "competent
evidence"); LaGrange v. State, 238 Ind. 689, 153 N.E.2d 593 (1958) (when alleged contem-
nor's conduct was within presence or direct knowledge of court, contemnor cannot deny state-
ments of fact made by judge; trial judge's statement must be taken as true); see also Note,
Attorneys and the Summary Contempt Sanction, 25 ME. L. REv. 89, 93 (1973) ("The degree of
departure in attorney conduct necessary to invoke the contempt sanction ultimately rests with
the trial judge.").
72. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155,
161 (1949) ("reliance must be placed upon the fairness and objectivity of the presiding judge");
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deference to that judgment is appropriately due.7 3 The problem is, how-
ever, that if appellate courts defer to trial courts' findings of obstruction
and wrongful intent, all but extreme abuses of the contempt power may
be insulated from correction, and the proper delineation of the boundary
between contempt and advocacy will be virtually impossible. Further-
more, once it is believed that the trial court can determine more accu-
rately than any other court whether conduct it has witnessed is an
obstruction of justice, deference to its use of summary procedures to try
the contempt seems natural.
Because the substantive standards for contempt leave so much room
for subjective interpretation by trial courts, the application of the defini-
tion of contempt in the courtroom often involves numerous fact-specific
determinations, such as whether an attorney was adequately warned that
her behavior was contemptuous or whether an attorney's obstructive
conduct was intentional.74 Moreover, because courts have permitted
contempt convictions to rest on highly interpretative factors, such as
tone of voice and physical gestures that do not appear with any accu-
racy,75 if at all, in a transcript,76 it is difficult if not impossible for an
LaGrange, 238 Ind. 689, 153 N.E.2d 593 (trial judge's statements of fact must be taken as
true).
However, efficiency alone is never a sufficient justification for the diminished due process
of summary proceedings. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965) (summary
contempt powers should be limited to the least possible power adequate to the end proposed);
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 500 (1974) ("[d]ue process cannot be measured in minutes and
hours or in dollars and cents"); In re Yengo, 84 N.J. 111, 417 A.2d 533 (1980) (summary
contempt proceeding is only appropriate where conduct in presence of court and if not imme-
diately suppressed, demoralization of court's authority would follow), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1124 (1981).
73. Although appellate courts have made some inroads upon the broad discretion granted
to trial judges to determine when summary procedures are necessary in the first instance, see,
eg., Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463-64 (1971) (where it is possible for a judge to
wait until the completion of the trial to try a contempt charge, the matter should be heard by a
different judge); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14-15 (1954) (where trial judge had be-
come personally embroiled with counsel throughout trial, he should have requested another
judge be assigned to hear counsel's contempt charge); Harris, 382 U.S. 162 (1965) (where
contempt was based on refusal to testify before grand jury after witness was granted immunity,
summary proceedings were improper because there was no need for immediate punishment),
they have rarely questioned the fundamental justification for extending deference to trial
courts to initiate, prosecute, and try contempts summarily.
74. See Raveson, supra note 18 at 775, 779-81.
75. Sometimes trial courts do describe for the record, either on the contemporaneous
transcript or in the written order of contempt, facial expressions, tone of voice, and other
characteristics of the behavior in question that would not otherwise appear on the record. See
infra notes 219-20 and accompanying text. Even when they do attempt to describe the offend-
ing nonverbal conduct, however, the descriptions are usually inadequate for an appellate court
to assess independently the conduct in question. Still, if the court attempts to describe the
conduct, it is preferable that the description be made orally on the contemporaneous record so
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appellate court to question the trial judge's characterization of the con-
duct in question." In part, this highlights the need for plenary proce-
dures at the trial level to produce records that more fully explore, in an
adversarial proceeding,78 the precise nature of the challenged conduct,
the alleged harm to justice, and other factors bearing on whether the
conduct was contemptuous.79
Guaranteeing plenary procedures in the trial court contempt hear-
ing, however, is not the only means of providing fundamental fairness to
that the contemnor can have the opportunity to rebut the judge's perceptions, and perhaps
even call witnesses if the trial judge permits it. Indeed, if the court fails to do this, it may
violate the contemnor's right to be heard. Where the judge characterizes the contemnor's
conduct for the first time in a subsequent written order of contempt, the contemnor has no
opportunity to respond, except in an appellate proceeding by supplementing the record, where
that is allowed. See In re Hallinan, 71 Cal. 2d 1179, 459 P.2d 255, 81 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).
76. See, ag., In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416 (court stated on the record that
contemnor exhibited insulting facial expressions and tone of voice, and that he laughed at the
court, none of which appeared on the record), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3326 (1990). But see
In re Hallinan, 71 Cal. 2d 1179, 459 P.2d 255, 81 Cal. Rptr. 1 (reversing contempt conviction
where trial court held attorney in contempt for using an "antagonistic, insulting, and disre-
spectful" tone of voice).
77. Thus, commentators have noted that appellate courts inevitably defer to the witness-
ing judge's conclusions as to what constitutes the contempt and presume the fairness and ob-
jectivity of trial judges. See Comment, Right To Jury Trial In Contempt Cases: A Critical
View of the Sentence Aggregation Rules in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania and Taylor v. Hayes, 70
Nw. U.L. REV. 533 (1975). Where there has been a full hearing below, either before the
offended judge or another court, the appellate court will be in a far better position to assess the
objectivity of the trial court's findings about the allegedly contemptuous behavior that does not
appear verbatim on the record. Similarly, where local procedures permit, an appellate record
can be expanded either by remand to a trial court for findings of fact or by direct supplementa-
tion through affidavits or live testimony. See infra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
78. When a contemnor is permitted representation by counsel and a plenary hearing, the
facts and legal arguments will no doubt be set forth more clearly on the record than when the
contemnor has no attorney and no time to prepare a defense or the ability to present one.
With a plenary hearing, the contemnor can also call witnesses whose testimony will add to the
findings of the trial judge.
79. If the full panoply of procedural protections were routinely afforded alleged con-
temnors in the trial court, appellate courts would be in a much better position to determine
accurately whether the use of the contempt power in the particular case was mistaken or abu-
sive; and to begin to develop more meaningful substantive standards. As one commentator
noted, with a deferential standard of review, the "appellate procedure is no more than a real
opportunity to perpetuate the initial problems of bias and the denial of constitutional rights
which exist in the use of the summary procedure at the trial level." Note, supra note 71, at 97.
Indeed, in In re Little, 404 U.S. 553 (1972), Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion,
noted the difficulty of setting substantive limits on the contempt power:
A contempt holding depends in a very special way on the setting and such elu-
sive factors as the tone of voice, the facial expressions and the physical gestures of the
contemnor; these cannot be dealt with except on full ventilation of the facts. Those
present often have a totally different impression of the events from what would ap-
pear even in a faithful transcript of the record.
Id. at 556 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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contemnors and creating a sufficient record for review. The salutary fea-
tures of the summary contempt power, if indeed there are any, can be
fully preserved by acknowledging the necessity for immediate punish-
ment, where appropriate, in the trial court, but by rejecting the notion
that the trial judge is in the best position to determine ultimately that a
contempt occurred. s° This acknowledgment, along with creating an ade-
quate record for appeal, can be achieved quite nicely if appellate courts
apply a de novo standard of review"1 in contempt cases, with broad au-
thority and responsibility to supplement the record when necessary to
fulfill their appellate function.8 2
A. The Justifications for De Novo Review
There are compelling reasons for concluding that a de novo stan-
dard of review should be applied in appeals of contempt convictions.
First, independent appellate consideration is necessary because the only
realistic hope for developing appropriate limits on the contempt power
and the outermost bounds of protected advocacy is through the case-by-
case appellate development of the underlying norms at stake. Thus, de
novo review is not only necessary in reviewing summary proceedings but
also in reviewing plenary contempt proceedings 83 because, even where a
contemnor is accorded full due process rights in a plenary hearing, it
remains important for appellate courts to exercise independent judgment
as to whether the record establishes an obstruction.
Second, with respect to summary proceedings, the inherent potential
for personal involvement and bias when a trial court alone institutes
criminal charges and imposes summary punishment mandates an institu-
tional check through independent appellate review.84 De novo review
would introduce a suspicion essential to appellate consideration of sum-
80. Indeed, the trial judge's personal observation does not necessarily obviate the need for
procedural safeguards to protect against the abuse of the contempt power, or for searching
appellate review. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text
81. Throughout this Article the terms "de novo review" and "independent review" are
used interchangeably.
82. The proposal for de novo review presented in the text should be equally applicable to
appeals of contempt convictions in those states that do not permit direct appeals of contempts,
but do provide some means of review. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
83. De novo review would also be beneficial in review of a jury's conviction for contempt,
although in that case a less compelling need is presented. See Comment, The Contemptuous
Attorney and Problems Concerning His Summary Punishment Under Rule 42(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 4 J. MARSHALL 3. PRAC. & PROC. 74, 92 (1970).
84. Moreover, even where a contempt is tried in a plenary hearing, the absence of the
legislative and executive checks and balances that are present with respect to all other
crimes-detailed definition of the crime and penalties and initiation of the charges-militate in
favor of closer scrutiny of trial court determinations of contempt.
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mary adjudications in which the trial court has the power to act with so
few of the constitutional protections taken for granted in all other crimi-
nal proceedings.
Third, apart from the potential for flawed decision-making in a sum-
mary proceeding where the offended judge tries the contemnor, the lack
of other procedural protections such as adequate notice to prepare a de-
fense and the right to counsel suggests the need for de novo review to
facilitate the identification and presentation of substantive issues and to
safeguard the fundamental fairness of the adjudicatory process for the
contemnor.
De novo review has been employed by the United States Supreme
Court, as well as state and federal appellate courts, in a number of con-
texts to review independently trial courts' findings of constitutional or
adjudicative facts,85 and by state and federal courts in review of adminis-
trative determinations implicating constitutional rights.86 Particularly in
the area of libel, the Cburt has held that independent appellate review of
trial court findings has been necessary in order to ensure "that the judg-
ment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expres-
sion."87 The Court has also applied de novo review of lower court
85. See, eg., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984)
(finding of "actual malice" in libel case must be subjected to independent appellate review);
City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 n.6 (1987) (independent review of record appropri-
ate in overbreadth and vagueness challenge of city ordinance prohibiting interruption of police
officer in performance of her duties); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985) (findings on "vol-
untariness" of confessions subject to de novo review). Although at one point the Court in
Miller refers to the "voluntariness" of a confession as a legal, rather than a factual question, id.
at 110, the Court itself emphasizes that the "law/fact" distinction is a specious one, often made
for purely conclusory reasons. Id. at 113-14. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
With respect to the meaning and interchangeability of the terms "constitutional facts"
and "adjudicative facts" on the one hand, and the distinction between these terms and simple
"historical facts" on the other, see infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
86. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Bor-
ough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936);
Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 34, 520 P.2d 29,
32-33, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 808-09 (1974) (citing Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 144-47, 481
P.2d 242, 251-54, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 243-46 (1971)); General Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
335 So. 2d 151, 158 (Ala. 1976); Iowa-Illinois Gas and Elec. Co. v. Commerce Comm'n, 412
N.W.2d 600, 604 (Iowa 1987).
The State of California engages in independent review of adjudicative facts found by ad-
ministrative agencies even if the right at stake is not a constitutional right but is deemed funda-
mental based on its economic significance and "'the effect of it in human terms and the
importance of it to the individual in [his] life situation.' "Strumsky, 11 Cal. 3d at 44, 520 P.2d
at 40, 112 Cal. Rptr at 816 (quoting Bixby, 4 Cal. 3d at 144, 481 P.2d at 252, 93 Cal. Rptr. at
244). For a detailed examination of de novo review of agency examinations, see Note, De Novo
Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Factual Determinations Implicating Constitutional
Rights, 88 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1483 (1988).
87. Bose, 466 U.S. at 499 (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).
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findings in a number of other constitutional areas, most notably to find-
ings of "voluntariness" of confessions,"8 and other first amendment areas
such as obscenity,89 fighting words,9° incitement to riot,9 and child por-
nography.92 Indeed, in the context of contempt itself, the Court has
sometimes eschewed a deferential standard of review in favor of an in-
dependent review of the findings of fact.93
Courts and commentators have derived a constitutional basis for
employing independent review of constitutional facts from the Due Pro-
cess Clause,94 as an aspect of the importance accorded the substantive
right at stake,9 5 and from Article III of the United States Constitution.
96
Commentators relying on any or all three of these constitutional sources
88. See Miller, 474 U.S. 104. Since Miller was decided, numerous circuit courts have
applied the independent review requirement to direct appeals from federal district courts in-
volving the "voluntariness" of confessions. See U.S. v. Baird, 851 F.2d 376, 379 (D.C. Cir.
1988); United States v. Fraction, 795 F.2d 12, 14 (3d Cir. 1986).
89. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
90. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
91. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
92. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 (1982).
93. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367,
373 (1947); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 386 (1962); Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1,
12-13 (1952). But see Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 160 (1948) (state court contempt convic-
tion will be upheld if there is sufficient evidence to support the conviction); Illinois v. Allen,
397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (contempt conviction upheld as within trial court's discretion).
94. In his dissenting opinions in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) and St. Joseph
Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1938), Justice Brandeis developed a due pro-
cess.based theory for judicial review of administratively determined facts of constitutional
magnitude, arguing, in essence, that sometimes due process requires access to a judicial tribu-
nal. See Crowell, 285 U.S. at 87-88 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The Due Process Clause has
been invoked in subsequent Supreme Court decisions holding that de novo review of certain
agency determinations is constitutionally mandated. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying
text. At least one commentator has urged that a due process based test would provide a uni-
fied framework for a court to determine when independent review of both administrative and
inferior judicial determinations are warranted. See Note, supra note 86, at 1486-90.
95. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 503-11 (1984). Of
the three justifications offered by the Bose Court as underlying its use of independent review-
the common law heritage of actual malice, the need for norm elaboration, and the importance
of the constitutional values protected-the importance of first amendment values actually
"drives the opinion." See Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229,
242-44 (1985).
96. Article III establishes the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court and inferior
federal courts, and Section 2 extends the federal judicial power to, inter alia:
[A]Il Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority...
to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies be-
tween two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between
Citizens of different States, between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.
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of de novo review have identified a number of variables or tests to deter-
mine when de novo review should, and perhaps even must, be exercised
under certain circumstances.97 The various tests rely on a number of
overlapping concerns which, in essence, fall into three general areas, all
of which apply with particular force to contempt: a need for norm elabo-
ration by appellate courts through case-by-case determinations of indi-
vidual factual situations, the importance and unique vulnerability of
certain rights, and the need to compensate for inherent institutional
deficiencies.98
1. Norm Elaboration
The need for norm elaboration has been emphatically recognized by
the Supreme Court in the area of the First Amendment in Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc, 99 a libel case in which a loud-
speaker manufacturer charged that a magazine article evaluating numer-
ous brands of loudspeaker systems contained a false statement of fact
For a discussion of the reliance on article III concerns as requiring independent judicial
review, see generally Crowell, 285 U.S. 22. For commentary, see L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CON-
TROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 642 n.7, 651 (1965); Monaghan, supra note 95, at 254 n.1.
97. For example, Professor Monaghan argues that independent review of constitutional
facts may be mandatory as to judicial review of administrative decisions, but should be discre-
tionary with a reviewing court in cases involving judicial review of inferior federal and state
courts. Monaghan asserts that the Constitution endows reviewing courts with the authority to
employ de novo review (despite legislative deferential standards of review), but that it should
only be used as needed, depending on the existence in each case of certain factors, the two most
important being "the need for continuous development of constitutional principles on a case-
by-case basis" and "the danger of systemic bias of other actors in the judicial system." See
Monaghan, supra note 95, at 238-39.
Another model that urges a "flexible approach" to de novo review suggests that the deter-
mination of whether independent review is warranted should be based on due process concerns
rather than the nature of the right at issue. This analysis is derived from the balancing test
applied by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), in which the
Court had to determine whether it was a violation of due process to allow a procedure by
which social security benefits could be taken away without a hearing. The Mathews test takes
into account the private interests implicated: the risk of an erroneous determination by reason
of the process accorded, the probable value of added procedural safeguards, and the public
interest and administrative burdens, including the costs that additional procedures would in-
volve. Id. at 335. This is a broader test than Monaghan's as it would apply equally to review
of both administrative and judicial determinations, and does not limit independent review to
constitutional rights, but would include any rights deemed to be of sufficient importance, even
those guaranteed by state law. According to this view, even judicial review of administrative
decisions involving constitutional rights only warrants de novo review in those cases where
there is a demonstrated bias or inability in a particular agency to decide particular kinds of
issues, and the other factors, in balance, warrant de novo review. See Note, supra note 86, at
1500-03.
98. One commentator would add to these three considerations the public interest and
administrative burdens involved with de novo review. See Note, supra note 86, at 1500-03.
99. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
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when it described the sound of instruments heard through the speakers
as "wandering along the wall." The district court found that the manu-
facturer was a "public figure" as defined in New York Times v. Sulli-
van,"' but that the plaintiff had sustained its burden of proof that the
statement was made with "actual malice." The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that its review of the "actual malice" determina-
tion was not limited to the "clearly erroneous standard" ordinarily appli-
cable to federal district court findings of fact,10 1 but that it had an
obligation to review that finding de novo. The Court explained that its
rationale for employing de novo review of ultimate facts was based in
good measure 0 2 on the proposition that first amendment concepts derive
from fluid constitutional norms only through the "evolutionary process
of common law adjudication" ° 3-a case-by-case development of legal
principles-rather than the simple application of a clear rule of law by a
trial court. In "actual malice" libel cases, like Bose, fixing the degree of
fault or recklessness that can sustain a libel judgment requires a court
implicitly to weigh free speech interests against reputational interests,
and therefore warrants independent judicial review.
This process of elaborating dynamic constitutional norms through
case-by-case development is necessary in some areas because the meaning
of some concepts cannot be expressed adequately in a simple pronounce-
ment. Legal standards, such as "actual malice" and "reckless disre-
gard," that are not capable of being defined with certainty, can only be
given sufficient meaning through repeated application to varying factual
situations by appellate courts."
One concern underlying the Bose Court's rationale was its apparent
dissatisfaction with the fact that the district court had created a rule of
inference to determine actual malice with which the Supreme Court dis-
100. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) provides that "findings of fact shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of
the credibility of the witnesses."
102. The Court also found justification for its use of de novo review in the unique suscepti-
bility of first amendment rights to deterrence. See infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
103. Bose, 466 U.S. at 502.
104. See id. at 503 n.21 (quoting L. GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 304 (1930)):
And it must be kept in mind that the judge has another distinct function in
dealing with these elements, which though not frequently called into play, is of the
utmost importance. It involves the determination of the scope of the general formula,
or some one of its elements. It comes into play in the marginal cases. It requires the
judge to say what sort of conduct can be considered as condemned under the rules
which are employed in such cases. It is the function through which the formulas and
rules themselves were evolved, through which their integrity is maintained and their
availability determined.
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agreed. The Court was concerned that lower court findings of actual
malice in general, and the district court's finding there, in particular,
could establish inferential rules which, if affirmed, might have wide-scale
applicability in free expression cases. In particular it was concerned that
if the lower court ruling were permitted to stand, any time an intelligent
journalist used a malapropism 10 5 actual malice could be presumed.106
Thus, it is not likely that the Court ever viewed the district court's
finding of actual malice as limited to the specific facts of Bose, but saw it
as a determination of how malice can be proved, one that threatened to
inhibit protected expression. Because the elaboration of constitutional
norms is so important in first amendment cases, the Court found de novo
review of the district court absolutely necessary in order to maintain the
rule-making function strictly within the province of the appellate courts.
Another area where the fluidity of a constitutional norm has war-
ranted independent review is in the "voluntariness" of confessions. 10 7 A
major issue in forced confessions cases is whether any particular interro-
gation technique is "so offensive to a civilized system of justice" as to run
afoul of due process limitations,108 an inquiry that subsumes a "'com-
plex of values.' "109 This kind of issue obviously involves a continuous
elaboration of a constitutional norm and judicial analysis of social facts,
and is, therefore, the kind of substantive constitutional issue the resolu-
tion of which dictates independent appellate review.110
Like actual malice and the voluntariness of confessions, the area of
contempt involves a continuous elaboration of constitutional norms that
105. As noted earlier, the statement considered libelous by the plaintiff in Bose was that the
"instruments ... tended to wander about the room." In testimony, the reporter stated that
what he meant to imply was that the sound of the instruments moved "across the rear wall
from the two speakers." Id at 495 n. 11. It was apparent that had this statement been made
instead, it would not have been libelous.
106. The Court noted, "Under the district court's analysis, any individual using a mala-
propism might be liable, simply because an intelligent speaker would have to know that the
term was inaccurate in context, even though he did not realize his folly at the time." Id at
513.
107. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985). Although Miller arose out of a habeas
corpus proceeding involving federal review of a state court determination as to "voluntari-
ness," it is clear that the Supreme Court's utilization of independent review was based on the
need for norm elaboration in this area rather than out of a particular distrust of the state
court's fact-finding or institutional deficiency. Since Miller was decided, numerous circuit
courts have applied the independent review requirement to direct appeals from federal district
courts involving the "voluntariness" of confessions. See United States v. Baird, 851 F.2d 376,
379 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United States v. Fraction, 795 F.2d 12, 14 (3d Cir. 1986).
108. Miller, 474 U.S. at 109.
109. Id. at 116 (quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1958)).
110. See Monaghan, supra note 95, at 242-43, for a complete description of the kinds of
norms the application of which requires de novo judicial review.
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balance, on the one hand, the need for vigorous advocacy and the right of
free expression, and, on the other hand, the need for respect of the court
and a fair and orderly system of justice.11 ' Indeed, the concept of an
obstruction of the administration of justice has, other than in the most
blatant circumstances, virtually no meaning absent this process. 112 Of all
the complex and vague concepts related to the First Amendment, the
111. It is natural that the two areas, defamation and contempt, should reflect similar issues
and means of resolution. The earlier contempt cases, especially, involved at their core the
defamation of public officials, namely judges. In fact, in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 273 (1964), the Court analogized the issue of defamation to contempt of court by publica-
tion, citing a prior contempt case, Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946) (criticism of
judges' inclinations or actions did not present clear and present danger to administration of
justice such as to constitute contempt because, although cases were still pending on other
points or might be reviewed by rehearings, criticism was of judicial action already taken).
It is extremely interesting in light of the Court's analogy that, although Pennekamp and
the Court's other contempt cases involving extrajudicial criticism of judges, Bridges v. Califor-
nia, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (union leader's public release of telegram to Secretary of Labor pre-
dicting massive strike if California state court attempted to enforce its decision in labor dispute
not contempt because did not rise to level of clear and present danger of interference with
administration of justice); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (newspaper's criticism of
elected county layperson judge for mishandling of civil case not contemptuous); Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962) (sheriff's letter to grand jury and the press criticizing as racist
grand jury's investigation into charges of electoral corruption involving bloc-voting by Afri-
can-Americans not contempt), utilized the clear and present danger test to measure the consti-
tutional limits of speech, New York Times ultimately eschewed that standard for the "actual
malice" test. It seems quite clear, however, that while the Court's opinion rejected the kind of
ad hoe balancing usually associated with the clear and present danger test, it engaged in the
same balancing process, grounded on more generic considerations, to produce a categorical
standard. Any effort to fashion a similarly categorical or definitional standard with respect to
the limits of advocacy and the contempt power must fail. See Raveson, supra note 18, at 775-
78. For, whatever the definitional standard for obstruction or contempt, whether an attorney's
specific conduct comes within that test, whether in fact it is obstructive at all, as opposed to
beneficial to the administration of justice, can only be determined in the context of a particular
case. Id.
The kind of definitional balancing of generic interests engaged in by the Court in New
York Times, which underscored the need there for a zone of insulation around valuable expres-
sion, is equally critical in the context of contempt. Just as the Court, in order to neutralize the
chilling effect of possible defamation actions, mandates a higher standard than mere falsehood,
so too with minor lapses of advocacy and courtroom decorum; it is not that the falsehoods or
lapses are themselves valuable, but that the vigorousness of debate is. Thus, adequate protec-
tion of the zealousness of trial advocacy requires that a similar "buffer zone" be fashioned
around in-court expression that is valuable to the realization of justice, in order to insulate it
from the contempt power. See Raveson, supra note 18, at 779-85.
The difference in the area of contempt, however, is that rather than resulting in a categori-
cal definition of obstruction, the creation of a zone of insulation around vigorous and valuable
advocacy will inform, or be an element of the calculus in, the case-by-case resolution of the
issue. Id. This "buffer zone" analysis manifests itself in many of the variables that should be
utilized in properly balancing the interests at stake. Indeed, as discussed in the preceding text,
even with respect to the actual malice standard, there is a continuing case-by-case evolution of
the constitutional norms encompassed within that test.
112. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
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concept of an "obstruction of the administration of justice" perhaps car-
ries the greatest risk of misapplication, not only because the term itself is
so susceptible to varying definitions in different contexts but also because
the determination of whether an "obstruction" occurred is most often
made within a very short time of the incident and by one who is person-
ally involved. If independent review is necessary in first amendment
cases because the standards are simply too indeterminate to be left to the
jury or trial judge, the case for independent review in the area of con-
tempt is even more compelling. Because the definition of obstruction is
inherently indeterminate, vigorous advocacy will inevitably be confused
with disrespect and obstruction of justice.
Given the criminal nature of contempt and the possible deprivation
of liberty involved, the necessity of the development and enunciation of
clear rules of law in the area of contempt may be even more essential
than in the context of libel.'
1 3
Moreover, as the only remaining common law crime,1 4 contempt is
particularly dependent on norm elaboration by appellate courts for its
definition. Only appellate courts, with their special expertise in applying
legal standards to facts and their broader view of the significance of indi-
vidual facts, are equipped to develop legal norms through specific case
analysis. With this task presently entrusted to individual trial courts, the
resulting legal standards for contempt have been unmanageably and un-
predictably disparate.
2. The Importance of the Right and Its Susceptibility to Deterrence
A second, though considered by some commentators to be primary,
justification offered by the Bose Court for employing de novo review is
derived from the value of the right of free expression' and its particular
vulnerability to the "chilling effect.""' 6 As the Supreme Court stated:
113. Indeed, to the extent that more precise elaboration of the outer limits of contempt is
the only way to provide adequate notice of the actual definition of the crime of contempt,
careful norm elaboration by appellate courts may be required by the Due Process Clause.
114. See Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 245 (1943).
115. It has been suggested that the first amendment right is a favored right, that in addition
to its particular vulnerability to chilling it has some intrinsic importance beyond that of other
constitutional rights. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 582 (1976) (first
amendment right is a preferred right). Professor Monaghan identifies a special first amend-
ment "due process," "a special concern for procedural protection adequately sensitive to First
Amendment interests." Monaghan, supra note 95, at 270 n.230. For a more thorough discus-
sion of this proposition, see Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REv.
518 (1970).
116. See Monaghan, supra note 95, at 242-44 (arguing that this concern "drives" the
Court's opinion in Bose).
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[Tihe Court has regularly conducted an independent review of the
record both to be sure that the speech in question actually falls
within the unprotected category and to confine the perimeters of
any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits in an ef-
fort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited. Pro-
viding triers of fact with a general description of the type of
communication whose content is unworthy of protection has not,
in and of itself, served sufficiently to narrow the category, nor
served to eliminate the danger that decisions by triers of fact may
inhibit the expression of protected ideas.'
17
Thus, the Supreme Court goes so far as to say that the susceptibility of
first amendment rights to improper self-censorship makes independent
review by an appellate court mandatory in this area. The extremely high
rate of reversal that exists in first amendment cases is a strong indication
that a high level of improper deterrence does in fact exist118 and that trial
courts are not well-suited to applying the complex and indeterminate
standards governing the law of contempt to the facts before them. Thus,
independent review may be necessary in order to reduce the wide margin
of error.
Although the Bose Court ostensibly confined its holding to first
amendment cases,' 1 9 the rationale supporting the Bose holding would ap-
ply as well to the scope of review given to the adjudicative facts in a wide
range of constitutional claims, at least where a constitutional right has
been denied by a lower court. 120 Even if the holding is limited to first
117. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984) (foot-
note omitted).
118. The high rate of reversal in first amendment cases generally has been documented by
Professor Monaghan. See Monaghan, supra note 95, at 230 n.10. Monaghan questions
whether independent review is necessitated by the high reversal rate, however, arguing that
"without a breakdown showing a high rate of reversal on 'straight' law application grounds,"
there is no reason to believe that deferential review and a discretionary application of de novo
review would be insufficient to protect first amendment rights from being chilled. Because the
facts and the law are hopelessly intertwined, however, at least in some first amendment con-
texts, I would suggest that a breakdown along "fact/law" lines would be impossible, and to
some degree irrelevant. Certainly in the area of contempt, where the issue on appeal most
often involves the "mixed" question of whether particular conduct amounted to an obstruction
of the administration of justice, a high rate of reversal would indicate that independent review
is necessary to ameliorate the chilling effect.
119. Bose, 466 U.S. at 514.
120. The Bose Court suggested that independent review is warranted in free expression
cases in order "to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow
limits ... to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited," id at 505 (emphasis added),
and "in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the Constitution."
Id at 511. Thus, the opinion suggests that the appropriate division of judicial duties requires
judges to engage in independent appellate review only of lower courts' denials of certain fed-
eral constitutional rights in order to ensure that the right is not improperly denied or deterred.
Some courts have since explicitly differentiated their application of an independent standard of
Fall 1990"1 JUDICIAL CONTEM rl "
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
amendment rights, contempt is unquestionably in large part a first
amendment concern. Finally, because a contempt conviction may chill
an attorney's zealous advocacy as well as his free expression, any im-
proper factual finding in a contempt adjudication may deprive the con-
temnor's client of his precious fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendment
rights, and threaten the independence of the bar.
Thus, the nature of the constitutional rights imperiled by the con-
tempt power would seem to warrant as careful an independent review by
appellate courts as the determination of "actual malice" in libel actions.
Whether or not contempt is viewed as a first amendment issue-a right
of expression-or a sixth amendment or due process issue--a right and
obligation to engage in vigorous advocacy-or some combination
thereof, the right to advocate aggressively is clearly subject to chilling by
the improper use of the contempt power. 121 Indeed, the high reversal
review, utilizing de novo review where a trial court holds a restriction on speech constitutional,
but deferring to the trial court when the government challenges the trial court's finding of
unconstitutional restriction on speech. See Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 383 (9th
Cir. 1988) (This rule "'reflects a special solicitude for claims that the protections afforded by
the First Amendment have been unduly abridged,' while not affording special protection 'for
the government's claim that it has been wrongly prevented from restricting speech."' (quoting
Planned Parenthood Ass'n/Chicago Area v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1229 (7th
Cir. 1985))).
On the other hand, one might posit a concern for the necessity of de novo review deriving
from the fact that in certain first amendment areas, such as defamation, courts are willing to
allow some individuals to be harmed by the false but not malicious speech of others as a trade-
off for insuring adequate breathing room for expression. Under this view, independent review
would be most important where the first amendment right of expression was upheld in the trial
court, to ensure that individuals' reputational interests were not being injured by the improper
extension of constitutional immunity to defamatory speech. In combination with the interests
discussed above, de novo review might be justified most appropriately by the concern for a
correct outcome, regardless of whether the constitutional right at stake was vindicated or
found not to be infringed at the trial level.
Of course, in the context of contempt, even if the important interests of the administration
of justice such as order, obedience, and respect for the court arguably would justify independ-
ent review where those interests were trumped by the need for vigorous advocacy, as a practi-
cal matter the issue can never arise because in such circumstances, there can be no appeal.
Moreover, it is abundantly clear that even if a concern for the interests that may conflict with
the protection of a constitutional right might warrant a stricter standard of review, that in no
way undercuts the necessity for such review where it is the constitutional interests that are not
upheld in the trial court.
121. If an attorney's conduct is punishable substantively and summarily at the virtual dis-
cretion of the trial court, conduct at the outer bounds of what the obstruction standard should
permit is very likely to be deterred. In addition, the sanctions that can be imposed under the
contempt power are severe and are likely to deter a substantial amount of protected conduct if,
as is presently true, the definition of what is punishable as contempt is imprecise. In almost all
jurisdictions, including the federal courts, each instance of contempt is punishable by as much
as six months in jail before there is even a constitutional right to ajury trial. See supra note 39.
In many jurisdictions, there is no prescribed maximum penalty at all for convictions of crimi-
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rate in first amendment cases generally is rivaled only by the frequency of
reversals in contempt convictions in particular.
122
3. Institutional Deficiency
Although not articulated as a factor weighing in the Supreme
Court's use of independent review in Bose, other courts and commenta-
tors have recognized some kind of institutional deficiency in the proceed-
ings below as a condition that requires the use of de novo review by an
appellate court to compensate for that deficiency. The deficiency most
frequently cited has been referred to by courts and commentators as the
"legitimacy deficit" inherent in an administrative agency's determination
of a constitutional right. The legitimacy deficit in the case of agency
adjudications is rooted in the fact that administrative tribunals are
neither subject to the electoral accountability of the legislature and the
executive nor enjoy the independence of an article III court. 123 Accord-
ing to this view, Article III is violated when a litigant pressing a constitu-
tional claim is denied access to an independent judgment by a judicial
forum,'24 as Article III not only imposes the separation of powers but
also makes it the duty of federal courts to ensure that the Constitution is
enforced, and that a constitutionally protected right is not violated
through the factual or legal error of a non-judicial body. Thus, in most
circumstances where constitutional rights are at stake, the Supreme
Court has required reviewing courts to conduct a de novo examination of
those administrative agency findings which are determinative of the con-
stitutional right.'
25
nal contempt. See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969) (Congress has authorized
courts to impose penalties for criminal contempt but has not placed any specific limits on the
discretion of the courts); People v. Stoler, 3 III. 2d 154, 201 N.E.2d 97 (1964) (when no maxi-
mum penalty is authorized, as with contempt, the seriousness of the charges is to be deter-
mined by the severity of the actual sentence); see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
122. See N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 233-34.
123. For a general discussion of this concept, see Note, supra note 86, at 1487-88;
Monaghan, supra note 95, at 263-64.
124. Although technically this argument applies only to federal courts because the Consti-
tution does not impose the separation of powers on the states, some cases suggest that due
process may require state court review of state agency decisions. See Chicago, Milwaukee, &
St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 457-58 (1890). Moreover, state constitutions contain
their own separation of powers provisions as well.
125. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 578-82 (1968); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 187-90 (1964); cf Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (in challenge to Congress'
power to provide workers' compensation for seamen, Court required independent review by
judicial body "upon its own record and the facts elicited before it"); St. Joseph Stock Yards
Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936) (independent review of agency's constitutional and
jurisdictional facts upheld, but it would take a "clear case" for it to consider evidence not
presented to an agency). But see Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
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It has been correctly pointed out by several commentators, however,
that the legitimacy deficit of agency adjudications of constitutional rights
arises as much from due process concerns as from Article 111,126 and
indeed, an entire line of Supreme Court cases demonstrates that due pro-
cess concerns have to a large extent driven many of the Court's decisions
to employ de novo review of agency adjudications that result in a depri-
vation of a liberty or property interest.
127
In essence, both Article III and the Due Process Clause embody an
overlapping policy concern that some institutional or systemic deficien-
cies in the original tribunal, be it judicial or administrative, require a
more searching review by an appellate court in order to counteract the
deficiencies and adequately protect the rights of the litigants. 128 In fact,
federal courts, relying on due process, have on occasion employed a de
458 U.S. 50, 82 n.34 (1982) (plurality opinion) (where the Supreme Court observed that
"Crowell's precise holding, with respect to the review of 'jurisdictional' and 'constitutional'
facts that arise within ordinary administrative proceedings, has been undermined by later
cases").
In the same footnote, however, the Court cites two subsequent cases that approved of
constitutional fact review: St. Joseph Stock Yards, 298 U.S. 38, and Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259
U.S. 276 (1922). Thus, it appears that the Court's comment refers to the limitations imposed
in SL Joseph Stock Yards on the creation of a new record on appeal, rather than independent
review of an existing record. Commentators have more recently cited Crowell with approval
for the proposition that courts may not give deference to the facts found by administrative
agencies when constitutional rights depend on those facts. See W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, P.
STRAuSs, T. RAKOFF & R. SCHOTrLAND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS
1238-42 (8th ed. 1987).
It is unclear, however, whether there are some factual situations arising out of administra-
tive adjudications that require a de novo factual hearing by the appellate court. See, eg.,
Northern Pipeline Constr., 458 U.S. 50 (plurality opinion) (article III courts, not legislative
courts or administrative agencies, must find the underlying facts in common law disputes gov-
erned by state law); Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. 276 (de novo judicial hearing required in deporta-
tion proceedings). But see United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), where the Supreme
Court held that an article III judge could give deference to an agency's findings of fact on a
motion to exclude evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Rad-
datz can be distinguished, however, on the ground that the exclusionary rule is not a constitu-
tional rule, but rather a judge-made remedy, and therefore may not be entitled to the same
degree of de novo review.
126. See Note, supra note 86, at 1487-1489; Strong, Judicial Review: A Tri-Dimensional
Concept ofAdministrative-Constitutional Law, 69 W. VA. L. REv. 249,268-9 (1967); cf Rubin,
Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CALiF. L. REv. 1044, 1049 n.22 (1984).
127. See Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920); St. Joseph
Stock Yards, 298 U.S. 38; Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. 276. For further discussion of this proposi-
tion, see Note, supra note 86, at 1487-89.
128. In particular, in this context, both Article III and the Due Process Clause are funda-
mentally concerned with the requirement of an independent fact-finder and the need for proce-
dural regularity. Indeed, one comentator has suggested that article III concerns actually are
subsumed within due process considerations. See Note, supra note 86, at 1495-1502. Professor
Monaghan, on the other hand, would keep the "legitimacy deficit" arising from article III
concerns analytically distinct from a due process concern with the possibility of systemic bias
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novo standard of review of the findings of state courts in specific areas
where there is an institutional distrust, based on a demonstrated histori-
cal bias, of the state's ability to render impartial findings. For example,
in Norris v. Alabama,12 9 in which a number ot criminal defendants chal-
lenged the State of Alabama's grand and petit jury selection processes as
being unconstitutionally discriminatory on the basis of race, the Supreme
Court independently reviewed evidence, including books containing the
jury rolls, and concluded that, despite the state court's finding to the
contrary, the evidence showed that Alabama's jury practices did in fact
unconstitutionally discriminate on the basis of race.130 The clear impli-
cation of Norris and its progeny, 131 as well as the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of state court findings in coerced confession cases, 32 is that the
Supreme Court has at times harbored an inherent distrust of the state
courts' ability to correctly decide these cases due to a fear of the state
courts' systematic distortion of fact-finding and law application in certain
areas. 133 Although some commentators have looked askance at the
Supreme Court's lack of faith in the ability of state courts to adjudicate
federal claims fairly,1 34 the Supreme Court has persisted in its wariness
in the proceedings below, asserting that there is "quite plainly" no legitimacy deficit with
respect to inferior state and federal courts. Monaghan, supra note 95, at 262-63.
129. 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
130. Id. at 596.
131. See infra note 147.
132. See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (plurality opinion); ia at 641-42
(Brennan, J., concurring); Reek v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S.
199, 208-09 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S.
433 (1958); Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426 (1958); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 562
(1958). But see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (where defendant failed to challenge
below the admission of his statements as violative of the Fifth Amendment, a state procedural
rule may bar a federal habeas challenge absent a showing of "cause" or "prejudice" attendant
to state procedural waiver).
For a discussion of the Supreme Court's substitution of its own judgment for that of state
courts in coerced confession cases, see Note, Supreme Court Review of State Findings of Fact in
Fourteenth Amendment Cases, 14 STAN. L. REv. 328, 341-46 (1962).
133. But see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) and Rogers v. Lodge,
458 U.S. 613 (1982), where the Supreme Court failed to employ de novo review to state courts'
findings regarding unconstitutional discrimination in the areas of school desegregation and
voting rights, respectively. Later, when reaffirming the holding in Dayton Bd of Educ., the
Court asserted that the question of the defendant's intent to maintain a segregated school
system was a question of historical fact subject to the "clearly erroneous" rule. Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982).
134. Professor Monaghan, for example, finds the premise that state courts are not to be
trusted in applying constitutional principles "disquieting" and does not think it should be a
premise on which to base the mandatory use of de novo review. At the same time, however,
Monaghan's discretionary approach to the use of de novo review urges the Court to consider
"the need to guard against systemic bias brought about or threatened by other actors in the
judicial system." Monaghan, supra note 95, at 271-73.
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and has viewed it as a well-founded and necessary protection of certain
constitutional fights. 1
35
Another example of the use of de novo review to correct an institu-
tional deficiency of lower court proceedings is a practice some states have
adopted to expeditiously resolve criminal cases at the trial level without
interfering with defendants' due process rights. These states either re-
quire or offer criminal defendants the choice of a non-jury trial before a
justice of the peace, magistrate, or municipal judge. 136 If a conviction
results, the defendant is entitled to a de novo trial or jury trial depending
on the seriousness of the potential penalty. In this way, state courts can
lessen the burden of increasing case loads by the use of abbreviated hear-
ings, while ensuring full due process at a second hearing if the defendant
is not satisfied with the original outcome.
Although the term "legitimacy deficit," therefore, is not ordinarily
associated with judicial proceedings, and traditional article III concerns
do not arise in fashioning the appropriate scope of appellate review in
contempt cases, 137 the underlying policy concerns justifying de novo re-
135. Of course, there are many areas in which the Supreme Court relies on state court fact-
finding and even deems state adjudications dispositive of federal claims. See, e.g., Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (where state provided opportunity for full and fair litigation of
fourth amendment claim, state prisoner could not be granted habeas relief on ground that
evidence obtained through unconstitutional search was introduced at trial). Even within the
area of coerced confession cases, the Court has deferred to state court findings that a defendant
has waived his right to challenge an admission on fifth amendment grounds. See Wainwright,
433 U.S. 72. Supreme Court deference to state courts, however, often rests on deference to a
state's procedural rule rather than upon findings of fact.
136. See Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (1976); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104
(1972); Swisher v. Brady, 438 U.S. 204 (1978); Justices of Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466
U.S. 294 (1984); State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A.2d 137 (1971).
137. Indeed, to some extent in contempt proceedings, even plenary proceedings, there are
separation of powers considerations akin to those of administrative proceedings in that the
usual executive and legislative checks on the judicial power are bypassed. That is, with respect
to contempt, neither the executive nor the legislature has any role in ensuring that there is
sufficient evidence to sustain a charge, or in defining the crime. See supra note 84 and accom-
panying text.
Restrictions on both the substantive and procedural scope of the contempt power can be
imposed, at least to some degree, by the legislative branch as well as by judicial limitation of its
own prerogatives. A full discussion of whether, or the extent to which, legislatures can regu-
late the courts' exercise of their inherent contempt power, or whether such regulations violate
the separation of powers, is beyond the scope of this Article. The one, rather old, article
devoted to the issue concludes that the enactment, by Congress, of legislation regulating cer-
tain procedures in federal court contempt hearings, is a constitutional exercise of legislative
power. See Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in
"Inferior" Federal Courts--A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REv. 1010 (1924).
Courts are split on whether the legislative branch may limit the substantive and proce-
dural scope of the judicial power. Compare Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66
(1924) (recognizing validity of congressional limitation of federal courts' contempt power to
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view of agency findings have great force with respect to review of lower
court findings of contempt. Indeed, there is a striking resemblance be-
tween the inadequacies of administrative determinations and the institu-
tional deficiencies inherent in lower court contempt adjudications,
particularly with summary proceedings. For just as the separation of
powers doctrine is intended to act as a check on arbitrary abuses of
power by individual branches of government, and therefore imposes an
obligation on the judiciary to review findings of a legislative court, so
does the concept of due process act as a check on governmental power,
by imposing the procedural requirements of an impartial fact-finder, no-
tice, representation by counsel, and the substantive requirement that a
punishable offense has definite delineations. A trial court's use of sum-
mary procedures, authorized by a legislature' or exercised under the
court's inherent power, bypasses the whole gamut of constitutional safe-
guards guaranteeing fair trials. Like administrative determinations in-
volving important constitutional rights, the diminution of due process
rights permitted in summary proceedings and, to a lesser extent, in con-
tempt proceedings in general, can only be remedied, if at all, by de novo
consideration of the matter on appeal.
The Supreme Court's recognition of the danger of distortion and
bias inherent in certain state court adjudications, where at least the mini-
mal procedural protections of due process were accorded litigants, argues
for similar recognition by both state and federal appellate courts of the
far more ubiquitous potential for bias and distortion of facts in contempt
proceedings. 139 In summary contempt proceedings, those instances in
which the judge becomes personally embroiled in reaction to the percep-
tion of personal affront could be cured by that judge's recusal. 14 The
"obstruction" of the administration of justice) and Haines v. District Court, 199 Iowa 476,
479-80, 202 N.W. 268, 270 (1925) (legislative limitations on judicial contempt power "univer-
sally recognized as valid") with State v. Heltzel, 526 N.E.2d 1229, 1229-30 (Ind. App. 1988)
(contempt of court is purely judicial power, not the creature of the legislature, and is inaliena-
ble and indestructible) and State v. Heiner, 29 Wash. App. 193, 198, 627 P.2d 983, 986 (1981)
("court of general jurisdiction has inherent power to punish for contempt-a power which the
legislature cannot abridge"). The United States Supreme Court has recognized without com-
ment the authority of a state court to reject legislatively imposed limitations on its contempt
power. See Wood v. Georgia, 379 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1972).
138. Both statutes and court rules provide for summary procedures in contempt proceed-
ings. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1272 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-456 (1990); N.J.
COURT RULE 1:10-1, 2 (1983).
139. As the Ninth Circuit stated in In re Gustafson, 650 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1981), "Sum-
mary contempt proceedings are unique to criminal procedure: the otherwise inconsistent func-
tions of prosecutor, jury, and judge are united in one individual. Courts have long noted the
manifest potential for abuse." Id. at 1022.
140. See, eg., Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 17 & n.3 (1954) (court's comments in
presence of jury regarding counsel's "disgraceful and disreputable performance" was evidence
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vast remainder of contempt cases, however, will invariably involve judges
who are certain to have some difficulty distinguishing a personal affront
from an obstruction of the integrity or continuity of a trial, or of the
authority of the court. 14 1 Were the judge to have this degree of personal
involvement in an incident tried before her in any other area of the law,
there would be little question of the need for her recusal.142
B. The Distinction Between Adjudicative and Historical Facts
The term "adjudicative facts" frequently has been used along with
the term "constitutional facts" to refer to the ultimate facts found in
constitutional cases, usually by the application of legal principles to his-
torical facts, which determine the outcome of such litigation. Historical
facts, on the other hand, are the simple answers to the case-specific ques-
tion, "what happened here?" '143 Constitutional facts have alternatively
been characterized as a special category of factual questions that, because
of their importance, must be independently reviewed by appellate courts,
or as mixed questions of law and fact, because they involve the applica-
tion of legal principles to facts. 1"
As the majority made clear in Bose, only the constitutional facts and
not the historical facts generally are subject to de novo review by appel-
late courts in constitutional cases. Indeed, it was disagreement over this
distinction that divided the Court in Bose, as the majority concluded that
independent review was warranted because a determination of "actual
malice" involved the application of constitutional principles to the histor-
ical facts' 45-at the least, a mixed question of law and fact-while the
dissenting justices asserted that it involved no more than "the mens rea
of an author.., a pure question of [historical] fact."' 146 Because the first
that contempt charge was a result of judge's personal embroilment); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S.
488 (1974) (summary adjudication at end of trial violated due process because judge was per-
sonally embroiled and contemnor was not given notice and opportunity to be heard); Johnson
v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 216 (1971) (violation of due process where judge adjudicating
contempt involved in conflict with contemnor on unrelated matter); Mayberry v. Penn-
sylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (contemnor denied due process because judge and contemnor
had become personally embroiled in controversy).
141. As the Court noted in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974), abuse of the
contempt power is not uncommon because contemptuous conduct "often strikes at the most
vulnerable and human qualities of a judge's temperament... [and even when not insulting]
represents a rejection of judicial authority." IA at 516 (citing Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194,
201-02 (1968)).
142. See Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEx. L. REv. 579, 624-27 (1984).
143. See Monaghan, supra note 95, at 234-35.
144. See Monaghan, supra note 95, at 234-38.
145. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984).
146. Id at 515-16 (Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
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two justifications for independent review, the need for an evolving consti-
tutional norm and the particular importance and vulnerability of certain
rights, do not call into question the trial court's ability to find historical
facts, it is fitting that independent review based on these justifications
would only involve independent review of constitutional facts. When the
rationale for employing independent review, however, derives from a
need to correct some form of institutional deficiency in the fact-finding
process-either because of a strict article III concern that constitutional
rights should be adjudicated in a judicial rather than an administrative
tribunal, or because of a distrust of trial court fact-finding in certain ar-
eas-the historical facts, as well, should, under this rationale, be subject
to de novo review by appellate courts. 4 7
For this reason, it would appear necessary to employ independent
review of historical facts as well as constitutional facts in appeals of sum-
mary contempt convictions. Because of the institutional deficiency re-
garding the fact-finding process in a summary hearing, as well as the
inability of the appellate court to determine from the record produced by
a summary proceeding whether the factual findings are accurate, all of
the findings of historical fact may rightfully be regarded with the same
degree of suspicion as the constitutional facts in first amendment cases
generally. 148 Such suspicion is warranted because the historical facts-
the trial judge's conclusions as to the contemnor's tone of voice, de-
meanor, and intent,1 49 as well as to the courtroom atmosphere in gen-
eral-contribute to the determination of whether the conduct was in fact
contemptuous. 150
147. See, eg., Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (Supreme Court independently ex-
amined evidence presented to state court regarding charge that Blacks were unconstitutionally
excluded from jury service); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550 (1967) ("it becomes our
solemn duty to make independent inquiry and determination of the disputed facts"); Pierre v.
State, 306 U.S. 354 (1939) (the Court must independently determine disputed facts where
claim involves equal protection of the laws); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922) (in
deportation proceeding appellate court required to compile independent record); see also
Monaghan, supra note 95, at 254-59 (discussing the assertion in some early constitutional fact
cases that federal courts reviewing agency adjudications should compile their own record de
novo in order to make independent findings of historical fact).
148. In New Jersey, where the standard of review in contempt cases is de novo, the court
reviews historical as well as adjudicative facts independently. See In re Yengo, 84 N.J. 111,
127, 417 A.2d 533, 542 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981).
149. The question of intent in contempt cases is always a factual determination to be
proved by such facts as whether the contemnor was sufficiently warned that her conduct would
be deemed contemptuous, the specificity of any prior warnings, and any pattern of continuous
misbehavior. See Raveson, supra note 18, at 830-36.
150. For example, in In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416, cert denied, 59 U.S.L.W.
3326 (1990), the trial judge asserted on the record that Mr. Daniels "laughed" in response to a
court ruling, but because there was no hearing and, therefore, no testimony besides the judge's
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The rationale supporting an appellate court's deferential treatment
of a trial court's findings of fact generally does not apply to summary
contempt proceedings, as the trial court's expertise as a sifter of evidence
and finder of fact-the ability to judge the evidence fairly in a case in
which the judge has no personal interest-does not enhance the judge's
ability as a witness, which is one of the roles the court plays in a con-
tempt hearing.15' Moreover, the ability to judge the evidence fairly is
fundamentally a function of the judge's position as an impartial fact-
finder, something he cannot truly be when the incident being judged in-
volves a perceived challenge to his authority or ability to maintain order
in the courtroom.152 Finally, the factual findings made summarily by a
trial court in a contempt hearing are often extremely unreliable in the
absence of an evidentiary hearing and representation by counsel. 3 Ap-
characterization, an appellate judge could not possibly know what the judge meant by the
word "laughed." Although the natural meaning of the word involves making a sound, the
judge in that case was apparently describing a silent facial gesture that could not possibly have
been reflected in the record. Therefore, in the absence of de novo review, the appellate court
can only assume the correctness of the trial judge's conclusions as to the historical facts-that
Mr. Daniels "laughed."
Also, the question of whether the contemnor had a fair warning that his conduct might be
deemed contemptuous is always a question of fact. See, for example, United States v. Seale,
461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972), in which the court held that whether the defendant was advised
as to what was improper courtroom behavior was a factual question bearing on the larger
factual question of his reasonable awareness that his behavior violated minimal standards of
courtroom propriety. See also In re McDonald, 819 F.2d 1020 (11th Cir. 1987), in which the
court concluded that in order for a contempt conviction to stand, a reviewing court would
have to find that the trial judge entered a "reasonably specific" order which the contemnor
willfully violated. As the court correctly noted, the question of the "specificity" of the order
was a question of fact which "must be evaluated in the context in which it [was] entered and
the audience to which it [was] addressed." Id at 1024 (citation omitted).
151. In most non-contempt cases, deferential review of a trial court's fact-finding is justified
by the fact that trial judges have amassed a great deal of experience listening to witnesses'
testimony and sifting through evidence in order to make considered factual determinations.
See, eg., Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985) (rationale for deference to trial
court's findings of fact is not only based on trial judge's superior position to make credibility
determinations, but also on her expertise in this area). In contempt cases, however, the judge
is not acting solely within the role for which she has developed expertise. Instead she is acting,
to some extent, as a witness herself, and is just as likely to misperceive an event that takes place
in her courtroom as any other witness. For a detailed discussion of the possibilities of mis-
perception, particularly when the incident is of short duration and the witness is under stress,
see Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 971-80 (1977).
152. Moreover, as Professor Kuhns notes, "The shock and spontaneity of most courtroom
disturbances probably increases the margin for error [in the trial judge's perception of relevant
facts]." Kuhns, supra note 3, at 50.
153. For example, in In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416, witnesses in the courtroom,
including the trial judge's own bailiff and court reporter, filed affidavits with the appellate
court attesting to the inaccuracy of the trial judge's crucial factual findings in a summary
contempt proceeding. Similarly, sufficient proof of wrongful intent in a contempt case fre-
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pellate courts could begin to resolve these difficult problems by rejecting
the assumption that the trial judge's observation of the allegedly con-
temptuous conduct obviates the need for strict appellate scrutiny, and
replacing the deference normally accorded these decisions with
suspicion.
154
For all the reasons discussed above, both substantive and proce-
dural, it would appear that the harshness and arbitrariness of the sum-
mary contempt power would be greatly ameliorated if the first appellate
court to review a trial court's summary contempt findings always re-
viewed both the historical and constitutional facts de novo. The first
court to review a contempt conviction resulting from a plenary hearing,
however, would need to review only the constitutional facts indepen-
dently, as there would be no institutional deficiency to cast suspicion on
the historical facts found by the trial court. If there is available a second
tier of appellate review of either a summary or plenary contempt citation,
in either a state or the federal system, the above analysis suggests that the
standard of review should be de novo as well, at least with respect to the
constitutional facts. Unless the highest court of a particular jurisdiction
independently applies the legal norms to the historical facts, lower courts
will be left to elaborate complex constitutional norms, and a primary
purpose for de novo review will be undermined. 155 The second tier ap-
pellate court would not need to review the historical facts independently,
however, as the institutional deficiencies of the trial court, in the case of
summary proceedings, resulting in unreliable findings of fact will have
been corrected by the first appellate court's independent fact-finding.
1 56
quently may be impossible without some evidentiary hearing. See supra note 150. Moreover,
even where an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary to resolve factual disputes in a specific case,
one would hope that legal argument with respect to whether the conduct in question consti-
tutes contempt would have significant influence on the trial judge's determination. See infra
note 172. Yet, courts have seemed particularly unconcerned with the necessity for providing
presentation of legal claims to the trial court in summary adjudications of contempt. See
United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 312 n.4 (1975).
154. Although it may seem that employing independent review of historical facts violates
statutorily imposed standards of review, where there is a constitutional imperative to employ
de novo review in order to guarantee due process, Bose makes clear that the Constitution
overrides any existing statutory standards. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
155. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for de novo review in the highest appellate
court when it stated in Bose that the requirement of independent appellate review "reflects a
deeply held conviction that judges-and particularly Members of this Court-must exercise
such review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by the Consti-
tution." Id. at 510-11 (emphasis added).
156. This is only true, however, so long as the appellate court has the broad authority and
obligation to supplement the record where necessary. See infra notes 214-31 and accompany-
ing text.
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The historical facts as found by the first level of de novo appellate review
may, as is ordinarily the case, be given deference by subsequent reviewing
courts as findings of an impartial fact-finder.
C. Should De Novo Review Be Mandatory or Discretionary?
In the various contexts in which de novo review has been applied,
courts and commentators have differed as to whether such review is con-
stitutionally required or is instead a matter of judicial discretion. In
Bose, in addition to holding that a finding of actual malice requires in-
dependent review, the Court also suggested that with respect to the area
of protected speech generally, it has not only the authority, but also the
duty, to independently review the constitutional facts.157 Although the
mandatory nature of independent review of constitutional facts has been
questioned by some commentators, especially because there is no consti-
tutional right to appellate review at all, 5 ' the lower federal and state
courts have extended Bose to require de novo review in various areas of
first amendment litigation besides libel actions.159 The extent to which
de novo review might be mandatory in other areas, however, is not clear
because the Supreme Court in Bose dealt with independent review as an
aspect of first amendment jurisprudence rather than developing a unified
theory of a standard of review that would include other constitutional
claims as well. Indeed, despite the Court's broad assertions with respect
157. Bose, 466 U.S. at 499, 510-11. At least one commentator has taken issue with the
Court's conclusion that de novo review in the first amendment area is mandatory, however,
and argues that although a concern for chilling expression is real, it does not rise to a level
requiring independent review in every first amendment case. See Monaghan, supra note 95, at
268-69. It must be noted, however, that Professor Monaghan has taken into account a special
level of due process protection accorded first amendment cases---"first amendment due pro-
cess"-and is, therefore, concerned about the possibility of "double-counting" the first amend-
ment interest. Id. at 270 n.230 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984)). See supra
note 115. In contempt, on the other hand, precisely the opposite is true. Unlike the First
Amendment, where a heightened level of due process exists, a contemnor is afforded less than
the normal level of due process. Thus, a greater sensitivity to the potential for chilling advo-
cacy is absolutely crucial.
158. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-
88 (1894).
159. See, eg., New Life Baptist Church Academy v. East Longmeadow, 885 F.2d 940, 941
(1st Cir. 1989) (holding independent review mandatory in free exercise and establishment
clause challenges to state law), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1782 (1990); Koch v. City of Hutchin-
son, 847 F.2d 1436, 1441 (10th Cir.) (same), cert denied, 488 U.S. 909 (1988); Don's Porta
Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 829 F.2d 1051, 1053 n.9 (11th Cir. 1987) (de novo review
mandatory in challenge to municipal ordinance regulating portable signs), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 981 (1988); Lebron v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 749 F.2d 893, 897 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (reviewing court must employ de novo review of prior restraint on free expression




to the obligation to exercise independent review in the area of free speech
generally, it is not yet clear whether the Supreme Court intends Bose to
apply to all mixed questions of law and fact concerning the application of
free speech principles." 6
The debate over whether de novo review should be mandatory or
discretionary may appropriately be viewed as a restatement of the ques-
tion whether "constitutional facts" are to be treated as questions of law
or questions of fact, thereby determining whether the standard of review
should be independent or deferential.161 Although pure findings of fact
are normally due deference by a reviewing court,162 mixed questions of
law and fact, especially those factual conclusions that define whether cer-
tain conduct is protected by the Constitution, are not entitled to defer-
ence if an appellate court thinks an error has been made. 63 For
example, although pure intent may always be a factual determination
appropriately made by the original fact-finder, 1" a conclusion that a
journalist acted with "actual malice" necessarily involves the application
of broad constitutional principles to established facts, just as a finding of
contempt-that judicial proceedings were "obstructed"-involves an ap-
160. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 386 n.9 (1987) (applying independent stan-
dard of review to claim of wrongful discharge for political expression); Renton v. Playtime
Theaters, 475 U.S. 41, 54 n.3 (1986) (reserving this issue for future consideration); FTC v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 41 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (refusing to apply
Bose to an issue of false and deceptive advertising).
161. See generally Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between The
Trial And Appellate Levels A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question,
and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C.L. REv. 993, 994-1007 (1986).
162. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982);
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985).
163. The standard of appellate review for mixed questions of law and fact has not been
consistent, as courts have persistently, and impossibly, tried to classify them as either law or
fact. See Louis, supra note 161, at 996-1007. Where a constitutional right is at stake, however,
reviewing courts often do not give deference to the "mixed" conclusions of trial courts. See
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
164. A finding of intent may be based on a pure credibility determination, in which case it
is considered an historical fact and is entitled to deference. However, findings of intent, espe-
cially in constitutional cases, may involve many complex inferences, often not wholly factual in
nature. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). But
see Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 623 (1982) (an intent to discriminate on racial grounds is a
pure question of fact subject to 52(a)'s "clearly erroneous" standard). In Bose, the majority
found that a finding of actual malice involved the application of complex legal norms to facts
and thus was not a simple historical fact. For a more detailed discussion of the complex nature
of intent, see Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De
Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976). Moreover, as Professor Monaghan has
pointed out, any historical fact may be transformed into a question of law if the sufficiency of
the evidence is called into question. See Monaghan, supra note 95, at 241. In that light, even
Bose could be viewed as a case where the appellate court determined only a legal question:
that the district court's finding of actual malice was not based on legally sufficient evidence.
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plication of legal norms to specific facts, including the actor's intent. The
real question to be resolved is not whether these issues are to be labeled
fact or law,16 but, as Professor Monaghan has succinctly asked, to what
extent does "the Constitution itself control the allocation of functions
among the various decisionmakers-appellate and trial judges, juries, ad-ministrative agencies-that commonly participate at some stage in the
resolution of all types of constitutional claims."' 66
The resolution of the question as to whether de novo review should
be mandatory or discretionary outside of the first amendment area is be-
yond the scope of this Article.167 The Supreme Court in Bose made it
clear, however, that within the First Amendment, at least with respect to
findings of actual malice in defamation cases, the court must employ de
novo review so as not to leave the determination of whether the speech in
question is to be stripped of first amendment protection to the trier of
fact. Mandatory de novo review in contempt cases would appear to be as
compelling, particularly when the contempt is originally tried in sum-
mary proceedings. In addition to norm elaboration and the vulnerability
of the constitutional right at issue, which the Court found to necessitate
de novo review in Bose, summary contempt hearings suffer from a serious
institutional deficiency. Even commentators who criticize the Bose
Court's conclusion that de novo review is mandatory in the first amend-
ment area agree that a legitimacy deficit may in itself suffice to mandate
independent review.'68 If we take the constitutional allocation of judicial
resources as the basis for determining whether independent review
should be discretionary or mandatory, one could hardly think of a more
165. It is often impossible to distinguish between factual and legal questions as these cate-
gories are often irrelevant to the issues at hand. Even the Supreme Court admits to the inabil-
ity to distinguish a question of fact from a question of law. Miller, 474 U.S. at 113. But
beyond these elemental propositions, negative in form, the Court has yet to arrive at "a rule or
principle that will unerringly distinguish a factual finding from a legal conclusion." Id.; Pull-
man-Standard, 456 U.S. at 288.
166. Monaghan, supra note 95, at 231. Justice O'Connor has restated this problem another
way: "The fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of the
sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide
the issue in question." Miller, 474 U.S. at 114.
167. For an in-depth discussion of this question, see Monaghan, supra note 95, and Note,
supra note 86.
168. Professor Monaghan, who argues that independent review of constitutional facts
found by judicial tribunals should only be employed on a discretionary "as needed" basis,
concedes that independent review of agency determinations of constitutional facts may well be
mandatory because of the legitimacy deficit in administrative adjudications. See Monaghan,
supra note 95, at 239, 262-64. Moreover, as to review of judicial determinations of constitu-
tional facts, Monaghan himself suggests that one of the two most important considerations
warranting independent review is the danger of systemic bias, which is one kind of institutional
deficiency that exists in summary contempt. Monaghan, supra note 95, at 239.
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obvious need for independent review than in the area of contempt. For
here, the only possible justification for the abridgement of fundamental
due process rights in a summary contempt proceeding is the grave neces-
sity for instantaneous action.169 Where that necessity no longer exists-
in an appeal of a contempt conviction-the Due Process Clause should
require "the repayment of interest" on the contemnor's "borrowed" due
process rights by reallocating judicial responsibility so that appellate
courts rule independently.
While some commentators have argued that constitutional fact re-
view undermines our well-balanced system of allocating judicial author-
ity and threatens the economical application of precious judicial
resources, 170 it would be difficult to demonstrate why independent review
should not be applied to the limited area of contempt. The arguments
that have been made against independent review are basically threefold:
First, that it undermines the trial court's authority; second, that it would
overburden the appellate courts either by increasing the total number of
appeals, encouraging frivolous appeals, or requiring more judicial re-
sources; and third, that it needlessly reallocates judicial authority.
17 1
These arguments are not particularly persuasive when weighed
against the benefits of independent review generally, but are even less
convincing when viewed in light of the anomalous character of a con-
tempt conviction. As to the objection that the trial court's authority
would be undermined, judicial authority would not be undermined but
would be allocated between trial and appellate courts to the extent neces-
sary to achieve a fair and impartial hearing. Moreover, a remand by an
appellate court for a supplemental evidentiary hearing to aid the appel-
late court in conducting de novo review is not in any way inconsistent
with, nor does it undermine, the trial court's summary contempt power.
Allowing an appellate court the opportunity to obtain a fuller and more
accurate record and to review the facts independently in no way dimin-
ishes a trial judge's power to level a charge of contempt or adjudicate
that charge summarily. Thus, trial courts would retain full power to
control their courtrooms, and to prevent or deter obstructive miscon-
duct. Conversely, the power of the trial judge to control her courtroom
169. Of course, in addition to the need for instantaneous action, the judge must have per-
sonally observed the conduct constituting the contempt and must have fairly concluded that it
would be a waste of judicial resources to hold a full-blown hearing before a different judge. See
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
170. See Louis, supra note 161, at 1015; Weiner, The Civil Non-Jury Trial and the Law-
Fact Distinction, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1020, 1039-41 (1967).
171. See Pendergrass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d. 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1950).
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does not ameliorate the appellate court's responsibility to conduct a de
novo review and, to that end, obtain a full and complete record.
On the contrary, the proven potential for mistaken use and abuse of
the summary contempt power would appear to require such review.
With summary hearings in particular, the findings of a trial judge who
was also a "witness" to, and perhaps the perceived victim of, the alleged
contempt, and who heard the matter without the benefit of defense coun-
sel,1 72 or on occasion without any defense presented at all, ought not to
be entitled to deference. Rather than strip the trial court of its power to
use summary procedures, however, de novo appellate review would sim-
ply compensate on appeal for the deficiencies of summary procedures
when the need for summary action no longer exists.1 73 In any event, the
trial court has no valid interest in immunizing its decisions and findings
from proper appellate review; the only interests of the trial court in a
contempt proceeding are in controlling the courtroom at a given time
and deterring future misconduct. With respect to deterrence of misbe-
havior, although nothing could be more effective than arbitrary contempt
convictions insulated from effective appellate review, the problem is that
the arbitrary use of the court's power inhibits, to a constitutionally im-
permissible degree, protected advocacy and expression. The sole
"power" undermined by de novo review of summary contempt hearings
is the power to ensure that the insufficiency of the proceedings below,
with respect to both the outcome and the adequacy of the record created,
makes affirmance of a conviction far more likely. That is not only a
power that the courts do not need, but also a power that the Constitution
should forbid them from exercising.
172. The benefit defense counsel provides to the court, as well as to the contemnor, should
not be overlooked. With an uncounseled contemnor, the court is called upon to be not only
judge and prosecutor, but, in a sense, defense counsel as well, as it is incumbent upon the court
to be aware of any possible violations of the contemnor's due process rights, any possible
defenses the contemnor may legitimately raise, and all relevant law. With defense counsel
present, the court should have all relevant issues and any defenses brought to its attention by
counsel.
173. When summary procedures were used below and a supplementary evidentiary hearing
is necessary on appeal, it is frequently indicative that plenary procedures should have been
used originally. This is not always so, however. There are instances where summary proce-
dures could be justified by necessity, the need for immediate action by the court, but, for
example, because the contemptuous conduct consisted of nonverbal behavior, the appellate
court would need a supplemental hearing in order to review the facts de novo. In those cases,
a supplemental hearing would not necessarily indicate that a summary hearing should not
have been conducted in the first instance. Still, it should be a rare case where the necessity for
immediate action is so great that a judge cannot take the time to hear any evidence regarding
the facts. Cf United States v. Moschiano, 695 F.2d 236, 252 (7th Cir. 1982) (when there is no
real threat that the contempt will recur, the court should not interrupt the trial and employ
summary procedures), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983).
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As to the second objection, it is unlikely that independent review of
contempt cases would either substantially increase the number of appeals
or take up a greater portion of the courts' time. Because the universe of
contempt cases accounts for only a small percentage of the appellate
courts' entire docket, the use of de novo review would not overburden
the courts, nor would it impose a major financial expense on the sys-
tem. 174 Moreover, the fact that appeals frequently are not taken from
contempt convictions, at least where no custodial sentence was imposed,
probably has more to do with the fact that it is often too costly to pursue
an appeal than that present deferential standards of review decrease the
chances of prevailing on appeal.' 7 Thus, even if de novo review in-
creases a contemnor's chances of obtaining a reversal on appeal, because
of the time it would require and the financial deterrent, it would most
likely have only an insubstantial effect on the number of appeals taken of
cases with noncustodial sentences. Moreover, one could reasonably as-
sume that virtually all contempt convictions resulting in custodial
sentences, at the very least where the contemnor is an attorney, would be
appealed regardless of the standard of review. Finally, even if a greater
percentage of appeals would be taken if the standard of review were mod-
ified, in the long run the total number of appeals may not increase sub-
stantially because de novo review should minimize the number of
contempt convictions in the trial court for two reasons. First, because
the trial court will be aware that the appellate court will be looking over
its shoulder with suspicion rather than deference, trial judges are more
likely to exercise greater caution in their resort to the contempt power.
Second, because independent review will result in clearer, less disparate
standards, trial courts and the bar will have greater guidance and the
courts will be better able to apply the law of contempt correctly. There
should consequently be fewer contempt convictions to be appealed.
The argument that de novo review would take up a greater portion
of the court's time even if the number of appeals does not increase, be-
cause it requires a more searching review and independent judgment, in
addition to a possible supplemental hearing, is similarly unconvincing.
Even under a deferential standard of review, the appellate court must
review the entire record for an abuse of discretion or a finding that is
clearly erroneous. Thus, unless a supplemental hearing is required, in-
dependent consideration would involve a similar review of the record but
with the appellate court substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
174. As discussed above, at present, many contempt convictions never reach appellate
courts. See supra notes 56-61.
175. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
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court. This should not require a great deal of additional time.
176
Although supplemental hearings would require additional time and
expense, they would not be necessary as often as it may at first appear.
Where an appellate court can determine from the existing trial court rec-
ord that the conduct in question does not rise to the level of contempt,
the conviction may be reversed without a supplemental hearing. Indeed,
a high percentage of contempt appeals are reversed on those grounds
already. In addition, a supplemental factual hearing is not required
every time a contemnor asserts a disagreement with the trial court's find-
ings; an appellate court must decide that a "reasonable" factual dispute
exists. 1
77
To the extent supplemental hearings are necessary, of course they
will involve a greater expenditure of judicial resources than will deferen-
tial review following a summary hearing. However, the argument that de
novo review is too costly has been proffered with respect to appeals of
lower court or agency determinations, when at least the rudimentary, if
not the full panoply of, due process rights have been afforded the liti-
gants. Whatever validity this argument may have in such circumstances
probably is eviscerated by the anomalous deprivation of virtually all due
process rights in a summary contempt proceeding. In this singular con-
text, it would be difficult to conclude that the minimal increase in costs to
the judicial system outweighs the Constitution's guarantee of a full and
176. The proposals suggested here for changes in the present scope of appellate review of
contempt convictions are relatively modest when applied to those jurisdictions that provide for
appeals from contempt citations. A number of states, however, do not permit appeals as of
right from contempt convictions. See supra note 57; see also Luther v. Luther, 234 N.C. 429,
67 S.E.2d 345 (1951); Brizendine v. State, 103 Tenn. 677, 54 S.W. 982 (1899); Wagner v.
Warnasch, 156 Tex. 334, 339, 295 S.W.2d 890, 893 (1956). In those states, obviously, changes
in the appellate process would have to include more sweeping reforms in order to fulfill the
purpose of appellate review, delimiting the contempt power, adequately.
177. An appellate court will only require a supplemental hearing when a reasonable factual
dispute exists and when it is necessary to resolve the dispute in order to determine whether
contemptuous conduct occurred. For example, if an attorney is held in contempt for making
an insulting comment to the judge in a sneering, derisive tone, and the contemnor admits
making the statement but denies the court's characterization of his tone of voice, a remand will
not be necessary where the language is sufficiently egregious to constitute contempt irrespec-
tive of its tone, or is insufficient to rise to the level of contempt even assuming a derisive
attitude.
On the other hand, if a trial judge holds an attorney in contempt for saying "fluck you" to
the judge, and the stenographer's record reflects the same language the judge believed she
heard, a supplemental hearing might be required if the attorney claims he said "thank you"
and can supply affidavits from others present in the courtroom who heard him say "thank
you." However, if the attorney claims he said nothing at all, or said something that sounds
nothing remotely resembling what the judge and the stenographer believed they heard, and the
attorney offers no witnesses to support his contention, the dispute would most likely not be
considered reasonable and no hearing would be necessary.
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fair hearing. If cost is to play a role in this determination, however, it
must be recognized that whatever additional expense de novo review
would impose has already been saved by the judicial system's permitting
summary proceedings in the first instance.
Finally, the argument regarding needless reallocation of judicial au-
thority and expenditure of time is circular. If one accepts the arguments
offered in support of de novo review in contempt cases, the reallocation is
critical, not needless. Furthermore, the Supreme Court itself has as-
serted that the use of independent review is less a reallocation of author-
ity than it initially appears because, as noted above, appellate courts must
review the entire record in any case to look for an abuse of discretion or
clearly erroneous conclusion. Thus, the closer look at the record below
could be characterized as a difference in the degree of scrutiny rather
than a qualitative reallocation of authority. 
17
D. Resolving Procedural Deficiencies
L The Extent to Which De Novo Review Cures the Procedural
Deficiencies of Summary Contempt
The fundamental rights denied to a contemnor when the trial court
acts summarily are the most basic guarantees of a fair trial-an impartial
178. In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), the
Supreme Court described the conflict between the deferential standard of review of Federal
Rule 52(a) and the independent review of the record required in first amendment cases as
"more apparent than real." Id at 499. Explaining how independent review does not differ
significantly from review under Rule 52(a), the Court stated:
The New York Times [v. Sullivan] rule emphasizes the need for an appellate
court to make an independent examination of the entire record; Rule 52(a) never
forbids such an examination, and indeed our seminal decision on the Rule expressly
contemplated a review of the entire record .... Moreover, Rule 52(a) commands
that "due regard" shall be given to the trial judge's opportunity to observe the de-
meanor of the witnesses; the constitutionally based rule of independent review per-
mits this opportunity to be given its due.
Id. at 499-500.
The Court went on to explain how even the "clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a) is
not a fixed standard but requires a stronger "presumption of correctness" in some cases than in
others, depending on such factors as the nature of the evidence and the expertise of the trial
court. Id at 500.
Thus, the Supreme Court seems to be asserting that the distinction between the two stan-
dards of review in terms of the judicial effort required to utilize them is not absolute. The
Court goes on to state that "[t]he difference between the two rules, however, is much more
than a mere matter of degree." Id at 501. While this last statement seems to contradict the
previous discussion, it is beyond the scope of this Article to explore fully the degree of similar-
ity between the two standards of review. Suffice it to say that whether the difference is qualita-
tive or merely one of degree, the Supreme Court has made it clear that even under a deferential
standard of review the Court spends a roughly equivalent amount of time and effort examining
the lower court's findings as it does when reviewing the record independently.
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fact-finder; the right to counsel; notice and sufficient time to prepare, and
the right to present, a defense; the right to testify; and the right to cross-
examine principal witnesses. 17 9 De novo review compensates for these
violations of the contemnor's rights to varying degrees. Although de
novo review may not always be a complete substitute for full due process
at the trial level, it, along with the appellate court's broad authority and
obligation to supplement the record where necessary, can often come
close to remedying the procedural infirmities in most summary contempt
proceedings. For example, the systemic bias and lack of institutional
checks created by allowing the "aggrieved" judge to serve as prosecutor,
witness, and fact-finder, could be corrected on appeal as a panel of new
judges"' ° would consider the findings anew.81 Likewise, the denial of
counsel would be cured by allowing representation by counsel on appeal.
179. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
180. All state and federal appellate court panels reviewing criminal and quasi-criminal con-
victions are comprised of more than one judge. The consideration de novo by a panel ofjudges
of a criminal conviction raises the question of whether the requirement of jury unanimity of
verdicts in criminal cases has any implications for contempt. That is, must an appellate panel
hearing the matter anew be unanimous in finding a contemnor guilty of contempt? The federal
Constitution does not require unanimity in a guilty verdict of a twelve person jury, but does
require unanimity from a six member jury in criminal cases. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130
(1979). In addition, some states require unanimity of a twelve member jury by court rule, see
N.J. COURT RULE 1:8-9 (1983), or by state constitutional guarantee. See State v. Lipsky, 164
N.J. Super. 39, 45, 395 A.2d 555, 558 (App. Div. 1978).
Obviously, a jury unanimity requirement has no direct application to a panel of judges.
One of the policy reasons underlying the unanimity requirement, however, is that it seeks to
ensure the constitutional standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See M. SAKS, JURY
VERDICTS: THE ROLE OF GROUP SIZE AND SOCIAL DECISION RULE 24-27 (1977). It has
been suggested, on the other hand, that jury unanimity serves other functions instead, such as
promoting the common sense judgment of a group of laypersons, a sense of community partici-
pation, and shared responsibility. Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. at 135. It is beyond the scope
of this Article to discuss the various purposes unanimity may serve; but to the extent that it
serves to ensure compliance with the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, it may also be
applicable to a group of judges charged with finding fact. To the extent that one judge of three
finds a reasonable doubt, it would be difficult to conclude that a contemnor is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Indeed, the requirement of a unanimous verdict may more logically apply to a three judge
panel than to a layperson jury. First, judges have a more sophisticated understanding of the
definition of reasonable doubt and are less likely than jurors to err on the side of finding rea-
sonable doubt where none exists. Second, when one member of a three judge panel is not
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts warrant a conviction, his decision consti-
tutes one-third of that panel, equivalent to four members of a twelve person jury.
181. Nevertheless, there is always a question as to whether even an appellate judge can ever
be truly impartial in her consideration of a contempt matter because, in a sense, the resolution
of every contempt citation sets the limits of all judges' prerogatives to maintain order and
authority in the courtroom. Moreover, because the appellate judge presides in the same juris-
diction as the "aggrieved" judge and most likely considers herself a colleague, there always
exists the potential, or at least the appearance, of cronyism. See Note, Criminal Law-Con-
tempt-Conduct of-Attorney During Course of Trial, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 329, 351 (the potential
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Even indigents who could not afford counsel would retain the right to
appointed counsel through at least one level of appeal.1 82
Where the contennor was not afforded notice or the opportunity to
prepare a defense below, de novo appellate review would grant additional
time to the appellant to "cool off," marshal the facts, research the law
and prepare a defense. Of course, where the defense on appeal relies on
evidence not introduced at the trial level because of a lack of time or
denial of representation by counsel or refusal to allow the cross-examina-
tion of witnesses, the deficiency would not be cured without a supple-
mental factual hearing.183 In particular, when the contemnor finds it
necessary to cross-examine the trial judge, whose perceptions and obser-
vations form the basis of the contempt citation, de novo review, along
with a supplemental factual hearing, would provide that opportunity to
the contemnor.
Courts must be circumspect in delineating the conditions that would
permit a contemnor to call and cross-examine the trial judge who im-
posed the contempt summarily. If trial judges were subject, as a matter
of course, to being cross-examined at a supplemental hearing whenever
they exercised the summary contempt power, they would understandably
be reluctant to impose contempt sanctions, even if punishment was
clearly called for.184 Thus, the mere fact that an appellate court reviews
the trial judge's conclusions on the record of the original contempt pro-
ceeding should not expose the judge routinely to cross-examination for
bias or personal embroilment. In such circumstances, at least where the
contemptuous conduct consists of unambiguous language appearing
clearly on the record, we should be able to rely on appellate courts to
for, or appearance of, judicial bias even on appeal is inescapable). Although de novo review
cannot cure this problem, it does make it far more likely that the factfinder will be impartial.
182. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
183. See infra notes 214-31 and accompanying text.
184. In general, courts are split concerning the propriety (with respect to the opposing
party) of calling a judge as a witness in a cause not on trial before her. Compare Merritt v.
Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973) (holding trial judge's testi-
mony as expert witness on behalf of opposing party with respect to matters that took place
before him in his judicial capacity prejudicial) and Commonwealth v. Connolly, 217 Pa. Super.
201, 269 A.2d 390 (1970) (judge's testimony in prosecution for blackmail as to matters previ-
ously stipulated to by accused overly prejudicial) with Woodward v. City of Waterbury, 113
Conn. 457, 155 A. 825 (1931) (testimony of two judges in personal injury action concerning
prior testimony of deceased party at former trial held admissible). With respect to whether a
judge may be compelled to testify, compare Woodward, 113 Conn. 457, 155 A.2d 825 (con-
cluding that while calling of judges should be avoided whenever reasonably possible, judges
have no privilege to refuse to testify) and State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (N.J.
1943) (same) with Hale v. Wyatt, 78 N.H. 214, 98 A. 379 (1916) (judge has personal privilege
to refuse to testify as to matters before her in previous trial of same case).
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ignore the trial courts' findings of contempt 85 and make their judgments
independently under a de novo standard of review. So long as the appel-
late court does not rely upon the trial court's findings of fact or conclu-
sions of law, where they are contested, examination by the contemnor of
the trial judge for any purpose simply is not relevant to the question of
whether the conduct in question was contemptuous.
186
On the other hand, when an appellate court reviews a transcript
containing findings of fact that are reasonably contested,187 including
such subtleties as the contemnor's demeanor, tone of voice, or facial ges-
tures, there seems little choice but to permit the contemnor to investigate
through cross-examination the potential for the trial judge's flawed per-
ception and prejudice.1 8  Otherwise, the appellate court would have no
basis for exercising its independent judgment as to the contested facts
that constituted the contempt.18 9
Of course, for de novo review to be a truly effective safeguard
against abuse or misuse of the contempt power in an individual case, the
185. See infira notes 206-12 and accompanying text.
186. Thus, for example, in remands of summary contempt convictions for new hearings
with plenary procedures, courts uniformly and correctly hold that the contemnor may not
introduce evidence addressing the alleged bias of the trial judge. See Howell v. Jones, 516 F.2d
53, 58 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that alleged bias of trial judge was "not material to the issue of
whether Howell's conduct was actually contumacious"), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976);
Offutt v. United States, 232 F.2d 69, 72 (D.C. Cir.) ("in the exercise of a sound discretion the
hearing judge may... prevent placing on trial... the judge before whom the alleged contempt
occurred"), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 988 (1956); United States v. Lumumba, 598 F. Supp. 209,
212 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
187. See supra note 177.
188. Cf State v. Green, 783 S.W.2d 548, 549-50 (Tenn. 1990) (on remand of summary
contempt convictions for plenary hearing, where trial judge in original proceeding testified
against accused, and portions of transcript from original proceeding read into record, consider-
ation given to evidence of trial judge's personal antagonism against contemnor held inade-
quate); State v. Pothier, 104 N.M. 363, 366-67, 721 P.2d 1294, 1297-98 (1986) (injury trials
for contempt, where portions of transcript of original contempt occurrence read into record,
contemnors would have been permitted to call as witness the judge before whom the contempt
was committed). Nevertheless, as a tactical matter, a contemnor might often be better off
calling other witnesses to the events at issue to contradict the trial judge, rather than attempt-
ing to impeach the trial court's findings through cross-examination of the presiding judge. See
also United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 372 (7th Cir. 1972) (hearing judge in remand of
contempt conviction may decide it is "unnecessary" for contemnor to call trial judge as wit-
ness). In any event, even if trial judges were in fact deterred to some degree from exercising
the summary contempt power as a result of the disinclination to subject themselves to the
possibility of cross-examination in an appellate proceeding, it must be remembered that such
self-censorship would not affect the trial court's willingness to charge for contempt, only to
convict the contemnor summarily.
189. This, of course, assumes that the appellate court would affirm the contempt conviction
were it to agree with the trial judge's findings of fact. If the appellate court were going to
conclude that the conduct in question, even as described by the trial court, were not contemp-
tuous, obviously there would be no need for a supplemental hearing.
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contemnor must appeal her conviction.190 But because of the time and
expense required by the pursuit of an appellate remedy, many contempt
convictions will not be appealed despite the fact that de novo review of-
fers a more effective remedy. 191 Moreover, the possibility that an appel-
late court might impose a harsher sentence could tend to deter the
exercise of appellate remedies even more.192 Thus, the possibility that a
trial court may employ summary proceedings might continue to chill
zealous advocacy despite the availability of de novo review.
On the other hand, with respect to the deterrent effect of the addi-
tional time and expense required by independent review, the deterrence
of advocacy might not be much greater if de novo appellate review fol-
lowed summary proceedings than if deferential review followed plenary
proceedings below. Although de novo review may add the expense of
hiring an attorney, and the time and expense involved in conducting a
factual hearing to supplement the record for appeal, those expenses
would not be in addition to the expenses of a trial, because the contemnor
never would have had the opportunity to hire an attorney and prepare
and present a defense at his initial summary hearing. 193 The costs en-
190. As discussed throughout this section, de novo review has significant salutary effects,
including the benefits of the appellate courts' expertise in the elaboration of constitutional
norms, as well as the probable deterrence of trial courts' misuse of the contempt power, and a
reduction of the chilling effect on advocacy.
191. See supra notes 59 and 175 and accompanying text.
192. Whether an appellate court, after independently reviewing a contempt conviction,
could constitutionally increase a contemnor's sentence is beyond the scope of this Article. Any
increase in sentence will be presumed improper unless the court places on the record facts
justifying the increase, such as conduct that took place subsequent to the original sentencing.
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725-26 (1969). But see Alabama v. Smith, 109 S. Ct.
2201 (1989) (the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness does not apply when a sentence imposed
after trial exceeds that imposed after a guilty plea).
Some cases suggest, however, that Pearce may not apply to a de novo trial following a
non-jury trial in those states that have a two-tiered trial system. See Lemieux v. Robbins, 414
F.2d 353 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1017 (1969); State v. Spencer, 276 N.C. 535, 173
S.E.2d 765 (1970); State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. 182, 276 A.2d 137 (1971). A de novo trial and de
novo consideration by an appellate court are not identical, however. With de novo appellate
review, unlike a de novo trial, the defendant does not always have the opportunity to present a
defense, or indeed any evidence whatsoever, if the appellate court deems the record of the
original hearing sufficient.
Furthermore, not only constitutional considerations, but policy considerations as well,
might lead the courts to conclude that a defendant's sentence should not be increased after she
exercises her right to appeal. See, e.g., State v. Vasky, 203 N.J. Super. 91, 101, 495 A.2d 1347,
1352 (App. Div. 1985) (in New Jersey, where a de novo standard of review is applied to appel-
late review of contempt convictions, courts have relied on policy reasons, declining to reach
the constitutional issue, in concluding that a contemnor's sentence may not be increased on
appeal).
193. If a contemnor was afforded a plenary hearing below, she should still be granted de
novo review on appeal because it is necessary to further the substantive goal of norm elabora-
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tailed in de novo review of summary proceedings would instead be
roughly equivalent to the time and expense spent by a contemnor who
was afforded a plenary trial in the first instance.
19 4
Ironically, because de novo review after summary proceedings only
permits the contemnor to defend himself on the appeal rather than at the
original hearing, that combination of procedures may actually reduce the
deterrence of advocacy even more than plenary proceedings followed by
an appeal utilizing a deferential standard of review. 195 When a summary
hearing is followed by de novo review, a contemnor will have the benefit
of waiting to see what sentence the judge imposes before determining
whether to hire an attorney and conduct a complete defense. If the con-
temnor had an opportunity at trial to conduct a comprehensive defense,
followed by an appeal under a deferential standard of review, she would
be compelled to defend herself against the possibility of serious sanctions.
Thus, with de novo review, the contemnor would be given the opportu-
nity to make an informed choice as to whether she wishes to invest sub-
stantial time and effort into her defense against the contempt. This
tion, even if it is not needed to cure procedural deficiencies. In that case, the contemnor would
not be required to invest additional time and expense on the de novo appeal, because she would
have had the opportunity to present a full defense below, and the de novo appeal would only
require the appellate court to apply a different standard of review.
194. Because a broad spectrum of contempt proceedings is available to the trial court, how-
ever, many times the trial judge will conduct a hybrid hearing affording the contemnor some
due process protections-the right to counsel, time to prepare a defense, and the opportunity
to call witnesses-but not others-an independent judge. See In re Yengo, 84 N.J. 111, 417
A.2d 533 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981); Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136 (1965).
The contemnor thus must sometimes bear the costs, both in time and money, of a plenary
hearing without a real opportunity for acquittal or impartial fact-finding because of the lack of
an impartial judge. In cases like this, where the contemnor is afforded anything less than full
due process protections, a de novo appeal will inevitably require some duplication of the con-
temnor's efforts to defend himself, and thus impose some added investment of time and ex-
pense. The additional burden, however, may not be as great as it would at first appear. For
example, when de novo appellate proceedings might have the effect of curing the deficiencies of
an otherwise plenary hearing before the "offended" judge, the additional burdens of independ-
ent review would be minimal as the independent standard of review would require little, if any,
additional effort by the party or her attorney; the existing record would reflect all of the perti-
nent facts and all that would be needed would be the impartial fact-finder-the appellate
court-to judge the evidence anew.
. In fact, this is a persuasive argument against ever allowing an "aggrieved" judge to pre-
side over plenary proceedings below. Once a judge determines that plenary proceedings are
appropriate, there is no reason not to have the matter heard by an independent judge, except
for the convenience of the court, and convenience alone is never sufficient justification for the
curtailment of due process. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 42(b) (not permitting "offended" judge to sit
on indirect contempt cases without contemnor's consent).
195. Obviously, the best combination for the contemnor is plenary procedures below fol-
lowed by independent appellate review.
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might be very effective in reducing the chilling effect of summary
proceedings.
Even if de novo review were utilized, despite its beneficial qualities,
it cannot put the contemnor in exactly the same position that she would
have been in were she granted the full panoply of due process protections
at the original hearing. For even if a de novo appellate hearing includes
all of the due process protections of a fair trial, the appellant has been
denied "two bites at the apple"-the opportunity for a full-fledged and
fair decision at the trial level prior to appellate consideration-that are
accorded others charged with punishable offenses.196 It is clear, how-
196. Whether a contemnor, or indeed any criminal defendant, has any entitlement to an
original finding of guilt or innocence made fairly at the trial level rather than the appellate
level is unclear. In Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980), the defendant had a state law
entitlement to have his sentence imposed by a jury, but the law under which the jury sentenced
him, which mandated a forty-year sentence, was found unconstitutional subsequent to his sen-
tencing. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the matter must be remanded to the trial
court so that the defendant could have the opportunity to be properly sentenced by the jury.
The Court reasoned that the defendant had a right to give the jury the opportunity to impose a
lesser sentence. Because the appellate court could not increase a sentence of the trial court, it
could only reduce it. Subsequently, however, in Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986), the
Supreme Court held that a defendant sentenced by a jury to death did not have the right to be
resentenced by the jury where, subsequent to the imposition of sentence, the Supreme Court
rendered a decision forbidding the imposition of the death penalty upon a felony murderer
"who does not himself kill ...." Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982). Cabana was
distinguished from Hicks on the ground that the defendant in Hicks at the time of his sentenc-
ing had a state law entitlement to be sentenced by a jury, whereas the defendant in Cabana did
not have any right to have the "Enmund" factor found by a jury. Although it could be argued
that the holding in Cabana does not preclude a defendant from having the Enmund finding
made by a trial court, and thus does not deny him his "two bites at the apple," it does preclude
him from having his original fact-finder, the jury, determine his sentence.
Thus, according to Hicks it would seem that when a criminal defendant has some entitle-
ment to be sentenced by a jury, due process would be violated by allowing an appellate court to
make that determination.
An argument could be made that the contemnor has a right to have factual determina-
tions made by a trial court because that court, as opposed to an appellate court, has developed
expertise in making such determinations. This claim could be satisfied by having an appellate
court remand any factual disputes to a trial court for a supplemental evidentiary hearing while
making the final adjudication itself upon de novo review. Still, the contemnor convicted sum-
madly will have only one level of judicial consideration instead of two.
Indeed, the determination of whether a criminal defendant has a due process right to "two
bites at the apple" has more serious implications as applied to contempt than criminal convic-
tions generally. For, if a summarily convicted contemnor is entitled to a fair proceeding in the
trial court, it would be tantamount to doing away with summary proceedings altogether. That
is, in order to ensure two tiers of review in every instance of summary contempt, an appellate
court would have to either reverse the contempt conviction or remand for plenary proceedings.
Thus, a summary conviction ultimately could never be sustained. Even if this right is recog-
nized, presumably it would be overcome by the judiciary's need to utilize summary procedures
which, in contempt cases, has overcome such established fundamental constitutional rights as
representation by counsel.
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ever, that a contemnor is in fact losing something valuable by not having
the original chance with full due process rights for acquittal in the trial
court prior to appeal. That is, the contemnor has been denied the oppor-
tunity to present a full defense before an impartial trier and therefore any
realistic chance of being acquitted by the trial court. Because the state
could not appeal such an acquittal, even de novo appellate review cannot
wholly substitute for a fair proceeding in the trial court. Obviously, to
the extent that summary procedures are permitted at all, 19 7 we must ac-
cept the fact that a contemnor's right to a full and fair proceeding fol-
lowed by a fair appeal may be abridged where necessity dictates. To say
that the contemnor's right to two bites at the apple could never be
abridged would be to do away with summary procedures altogether.198"
De novo review, however, should not be held up as a justification for the
denial of due process below, as any suspension of due process can only be
tolerated, if at all, because of necessity and the lack of any factual
dispute. 199
On the other hand, whenever an appellate court determines that
summary procedures were unconstitutional, because, for example, they
were not justified by necessity, because the judge could not determine the
facts without a hearing, or because the judge was personally em-
broiled,"c° there is no longer any justification for depriving that contem-
nor of her right to two full tiers of judicial consideration. In those
circumstances, permitting the appellate court to "remedy" the constitu-
tional violation below by employing de novo review, even with a supple-
mental hearing, probably is unwise; the better procedure in that case
would be to remand the entire matter to the trial court for a plenary
adjudication so that the contemnor is assured the right to a constitution-
ally fair trial.
201
There are a number of other reasons why an appellate court should
reach the issue of whether summary proceedings were unconstitutional
197. A very strong argument can be made that summary procedures result in an unjustifi-
able abridgement of due process and should not be permitted at all. The constitutionality of
summary procedures, however, is a complex question beyond the scope of this Article. For a
critical examination of the use of summary procedures, see articles cited supra note 30.
198. See supra note 196.
199. See supra notes 27-38.
200. See supra notes 140-41.
201. When the appellate court itself reverses a summary contempt conviction for substan-
tive reasons, le., the conduct in question did not rise to the level of contempt, the appellate
court may nevertheless rule on the lower court's use of summary proceedings as well, in order
to provide sufficient guidance to lower courts as to the appropriate use of the summary con-
tempt power. An otitright reversal of the trial court's determination to use summary proceed-
ings, rather than a mere declaratory statement, would be more likely to have a deterrent effect
on the trial court's improper resort to summary adjudications.
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in a particular case, and should remand for a plenary adjudication
202
once it determines that the use of summary procedures in fact violated
due process. First, the abridgement of the fundamental constitutional
right to a fair criminal trial resulting from summary contempt proceed-
ings is so egregious that it should never be viewed either as harmless
error 20 3 or remediable even by independent appellate review. Indeed, be-
cause so few procedural rights are accorded the contemnor in summary
proceedings, the limited rights that remain must be preciously guarded.
Moreover, if the appellate court will have to remand to the trial court in
order to supplement the record with factual findings in any event, it can
as easily remand for a full plenary adjudication by the trial court because
a new trial will not require substantially more time than a factual hear-
ing. As the purpose of de novo review is remedial, it would be perverse
to use de novo review as a justification for trial courts to violate due
process in the first instance because it may be "corrected" on appeal.
Another factor that makes de novo review inferior to a fair hearing
in the first instance is that a contemnor is forced to suffer the stigma of a
conviction and all of its collateral consequences during the entire pen-
dency of the appeal. That burden could be alleviated in part by affording
contemnors an automatic stay of any punishment imposed as a result of
the contempt citation until the matter is resolved on appeal. Still, even if
a stay were required, and even in those states that have determined that
contemnors will not suffer any of the ordinary disabilities associated with
criminal offenses, 2° certain collateral consequences such as negative
publicity, professional embarrassment, and loss of job opportunities are
inevitable,2" 5 and are likely to have some chilling effect on advocacy.
202. This is to be distinguished from a remand to a trial court to make findings of fact in
order to supplement the record for de novo review on appeal.
203. See, eg., Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988) (certain sixth amendment viola-
tions that pervade the entire criminal prosecution fall within the category of constitutional
violations that cast so much doubt on the proceedings that they may never be considered
harmless); United States v. McDonald, 620 F.2d 559, 564 (5th Cir. 1980) (comments that
penalize a defendant for the exercise of his right to counsel and "strike at the core of his
defense" can never be treated as harmless error).
204. See, eg., In re Buehrer, 50 N.J. 501, 516-17, 236 A.2d 592, 600-01 (1967) (a person
convicted of contempt in New Jersey does not acquire a criminal record with the stigma and
disabilities associated therewith, such as disqualification for jury service, ineligibility for civil
service, forfeiture of public office or position, or impaired credibility as a witness).
205. Even if the state in which the contemnor resides imposes no disabilities on a contem-
nor whose conviction is pending appeal, other states' practices may impose some kind of pun-
ishment during the pendency of the appeal. For example, the attorney in In re Daniels, 118
N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416, cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3326 (1990), who practiced and was held in
contempt in New Jersey but resided in New York, was denied bar admission in the State of
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Finally, de novo review, even with supplementation of the record to
allow the appellant to introduce additional evidence, will not always cure
the deficiencies below, as the record may be hopelessly tainted as a result
of the improper procedures. For although supplementation of the record
does serve to bring to the appellate court's attention significant facts that
were not made part of the trial record, and gives the contemnor the op-
portunity to call and cross-examine principal witnesses, including per-
haps the trial judge, for bias or mistaken perception, 20 6 it is difficult to
erase the harm that may already have been done by a judge who has been
either personally embroiled in the incident20 7 or involved to the extent
that he has perceived an affront to the dignity of the court. Furthermore,
the record below may be tainted because the accused, who is unprepared
as well as uncounseled,2 °s may have said things in the heat of the mo-
ment, in response to a charge of contempt, that might be mistaken for a
demonstration of willfulness to obstruct or a lack of good faith, which
never would have found its way into the record in any ordinary proceed-
New York during the pendency of the appeal of his contempt citation, which, as of the writing
of this Article, has lasted more than three years.
Moreover, contempt proceedings may lead to disciplinary actions against attorneys, in-
cluding disbarment proceedings. See In re Isserman, 9 N.J. 269, 87 A.2d 903 (1951) (perma-
nently disbarring attorney as a result of summary contempt convictions which were affirmed
by the United States Supreme Court in Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952)), cert. de-
nied, 345 U.S. 927 (1953); Note, Contempt Citation as Evidence of Unfitness to Practice Law,
13 J. LEGAL PROF. 271 (1988).
206. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
207. See, e.g., People v. Ravitz, 26 Mich. App. 263, 182 N.W.2d 75 (1970) (where judge
inadvertently admitted during the trial that he was angry with the attorney appearing before
him for having written a letter of complaint to the University of Michigan about the manner in
which the judge conducts hearings). Obviously, in most cases where the judge has acted with
bias toward a particular attorney, it will not be as explicit as it was in Ravitz. In fact, during
the contempt hearing, the judge in that case conceded that it was "unfortunate" that he re-
ferred to the article by the University of Michigan and admitted that he was "a little peevish
on that day on that subject." Id at 268-69, 182 N.W.2d at 78.
208. Even attorneys who are held in contempt need representation by counsel, particularly
if they are in the midst of complex trials, focusing all of their concentration on the defense of
their clients, when suddenly charges are lodged against them. See, e.g., In re Lependorf, 212
N.J. Super. 284, 293, 514 A.2d 1335, 1341 (App. Div. 1986) (because contemnor had under-
taken the "awesome responsibility of representing a defendant in a capital case" and "was
surprised by the sudden initiation of contempt proceedings against her, [her] own statements
were vague and somewhat disjointed"); In re Daniels, 118 N.J. at 57, 570 A.2d at 420 (attorney
who was charged with contempt during heated pre-trial arguments requested a few moments
to collect himself and, when that was denied, requested counsel). In fact, there are times when
an attorney's defense against a contempt charge may result in a conflict of interest with her
client. See In re Lependorf, 212 N.J. Super. at 293, 514 A.2d at 1341 (attorney's violation of
court order to turn over witness list to prosecutor did not constitute contempt where list may
have included inculpatory witnesses). For these reasons, courts have frequently concluded
that the better course is to wait until the trial has concluded before trying the attorney for
contempt.
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ing. In fact, attorneys' responses to judges when summarily cited for
contempt have been used by courts to establish their mens rea for the
contemptuous conduct charged.' 9 Thus, de novo review, even along
with a supplemental factual hearing, will not cure this fundamental lack
of fairness unless the appellate court also disregards those tainted por-
tions of the transcript, such as statements of the contemnor.
Indeed, the circumstance of a summary contempt trial may also im-
plicate the contemnor's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, because the accused contemnor who is not represented by counsel
has no practical alternative but to waive that privilege and speak on his
own behalf in order to present any defense at all.210  Even where the
contemnor has an attorney available at a summary hearing, he may still
feel constrained to speak on his own behalf, not having had sufficient
time to prepare or be properly counseled by his attorney. Without the
time to speak to potential witnesses in the courtroom to see if they may
be called to testify in place of the contemnor, there may be no other way
of challenging the judge's factual assertions, especially as to the contem-
nor's intent.211
The most important point is that even though de novo review goes a
long way toward curing the deficiencies of diminished due process pro-
209. See In re Daniels, 118 N.J. at 69-70, 570 A.2d at 426, where the trial court relied on
the contemnor's spontaneous explanation of his behavior while defending himself as evidence
of his wrongful intent. Of course, where a contemnor engages in conduct or makes statements
in the course of defending himself that would in and of themselves constitute contempt, the
court is not barred from charging him with an additional instance of contempt, for which the
contemnor should be tried. Conduct that occurs during one's attempt to defend oneself, how-
ever, should not provide the basis for an inference of intent relating to the prior conduct.
210. This is unlike an uncounseled defendant charged with a disorderly persons offense,
facing less than six months of imprisonment, because even though that defendant may also be
forced to speak in order to defend himself, his words in the courtroom do not bear so directly
on his intent to commit the crime. While a non-contempt defendant's demeanor and state-
ments in the courtroom will go to his credibility as a witness, a contemnor's attitude and
demeanor in court will often bear heavily on the court's finding as to his intent to commit
contumacious conduct. Also, in contempt, unlike other more clearly "definable" crimes, in-
tent is often more difficult to prove because there are so few physical "steps" or actions neces-
sary to complete the crime. Finally, when an uncounseled defendant charged with a disorderly
persons offense chooses to remain silent in the courtroom, the contemnor's failure to speak or
even to apologize may well be taken as a further effort to flout the authority of the court and
used as evidence against him to prove the contempt charge itself.
211. A contemnor's failure to call witnesses at a summary proceeding, in the rare circum-
stance that the opportunity is made available, should not be construed as a waiver of that right.
If the contemnor is offered the "opportunity" to call witnesses without having the time to
speak with them before they will be called as witnesses, the contemnor is effectively denied the
right to call witnesses. Indeed, in any other case, if an attorney divulged the names of wit-
nesses with whom he had not spoken and did not know the content of their testimony, let
alone called those witnesses, it would undoubtedly be considered ineffective assistance of coun-
sel if not professional malpractice.
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tections, the availability of de novo review should not be used as a justifi-
cation for the use of summary procedures; the suspension of full due
process rights can only be justified by absolute necessity, not by the con-
venience of the court. The utilization of summary procedures in con-
tempt cases can be viewed in either of two ways.212 In the first model,
contempt is viewed as a "crime in every fundamental respect" '213 and, as
such, the alleged contemnor would ordinarily be entitled to full plenary
proceedings with identical due process protections to those accorded
other criminal defendants, except where necessity and the fact that the
judge observed the conduct could justify eliminating particular due pro-
cess rights. Alternatively, one could view summary proceedings in con-
tempt cases as the norm, an exception carved out of the normal
constitutional requirements of due process, justified by necessity, and
proceed to determine which procedural protections would be absolutely
necessary to protect the contemnor in a specific proceeding. In either
case, the Constitution is allocating power by carving an exception out of
the normal constitutional requirements and allowing proceedings that in-
volve a possible deprivation of liberty without full due process, so that
the power of the courts may be sustained. In order to maintain a balance
of the allocation of judicial resources, appellate courts need to compen-
sate for the suspension of due process rights at the trial level by engaging
in de novo review, as the urgency justifying the suspension of due process
no longer exists on appeal.
2. The Need for Broad Authority and Obligation of Appellate Courts to
Supplement the Record
In order to exercise de novo review, an appellate court must have
access to a record that sufficiently exposes the facts to enable an in-
dependent judgment to be made. Even with a discretionary standard of
review, an appellate court needs an adequate record to determine
whether the trial court has abused its discretion or whether there is suffi-
cient evidence to support a contempt conviction.214 Thus, most jurisdic-
212. This point is also made by Professor Kuhns. See Kuhns, supra note 3, at 71-74.
213. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968).
214. See, e.g., Miller v. Vettiner, 481 S.W.2d 32, 35 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972) ("it is imperative,
incident to the right of appeal, that the facts be shown by a proper record"); Fisher v. Pace,
336 U.S. 155, 167-68 (1948) (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("[a] printed record cannot reveal inflec-
tions and gestures, the tenor of a judge's conduct of a trial ....").
As one commentator noted, "Unfortunately, most appellate tribunals content themselves
with merely determining whether the facts set out in the findings are sufficient to show a
contempt. In other words, they accept as conclusive the findings made by the trial judge and
pass only upon their sufficiency." Lane, The Contempt Power v. The Concept of a Fair Trial, 50
KY. L.J. 351, 392 (1962).
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tions at least require the trial court to certify that the judge personally
observed facts sufficient to support a conviction.215 Although this re-
quirement has, for the most part, been enforced,216 the deference ac-
corded trial court determinations under the abuse of discretion standard
has led a number of courts to accept very conclusory findings with regard
to the factual bases of contempt citations.217
Indeed, the record of summary contempt proceedings generally
available to appellate courts frequently is not adequate even for a rigor-
ous determination of the sufficiency of the evidence.218 When the con-
tempt is not based on language unambiguously set forth in the
contemporaneous transcript,219 but depends instead on facial expres-
215. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1211 (West 1972); OR. REV. STAT. § 33.030 (1989);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a). Because these statutes generally require nothing more than a state-
ment of facts, courts and commentators rarely mention the need for a specification of legal
standards. See Weiss v. Burr, 484 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (1974);
Note, Criminal Law-Contempt-Conduct of Attorney During Course of Trial, 1971 Wis. L.
REv. 329, 350-51.
216. See United States v. Marshall, 451 F.2d 372, 374 (9th Cir. 1971); Pietsch v. President
of the United States, 434 F.2d 861, 864 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971);
Tauber v. Gordon, 350 F.2d 843, 845 (3d Cir. 1965); State ex rel Spencer v. Howe, 281 Or.
599, 576 P.2d 4 (1978).
217. See, e.g., In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416, cert denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3326
(1990) (despite affidavits from those present in courtroom stating that they were close to con-
temnor but did not hear him laugh, appellate court accepted trial judge's certification that
contemnor laughed); In re Stanley, 102 N.J. 244, 507 A.2d 1168 (1986) (trial judge character-
ized contemnor's facial expressions as smirking, which contemnor denied); Kotowski v.
Kotowski, 3 Ill. App. 3d 231, 278 N.E.2d 856 (1971) (where no record of contempt proceed-
ings exists, reviewing court is bound to accept truth of court's allegations as set forth in written
contempt order); Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 806, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1961) (trial
court's finding of contemnor's sneering held sufficient, but finding that he was laughing at the
court reversed as being merely a conclusion).
218. The record from a plenary proceeding may also be insufficient to permit proper appel-
late review under either an abuse of discretion or an independent judgment standard. In those
circumstances, although the transcript of the contempt proceeding is likely to contain a much
more detailed explanation of the facts than if the contempt were tried summarily, it still might
be inadequate to capture any bias or misperceptions of the judge who has herself witnessed the
events in question. See infra note 223 and accompanying text.
219. By unambiguous language set forth in the transcript, I am referring to language that
the court stenographer has transcribed as spoken by the contemnor. Of course, the trial judge
can make her own perceptions part of the contemporaneous record simply by stating for the
record her own characterization of the events. Similarly, a judge's order of contempt, certify-
ing the facts upon which the contempt is based, is also considered part of the record on appeal
from which an appellate court can judge the sufficiency of the evidence. See, e.g., Sacher v.
United States, 182 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1950) (certification stated that counsel "[u]rged one
another on to badger the Court ... [and] made a succession of disrespectful, insolent, and
sarcastic comments and remarks to the Court"), aff'd, 343 U.S. 1 (1952); In re Osborne, 344
F.2d 611, 612-13 n.1 (9th Cir. 1965) (certification asserted that "[t]he statements ... were
stated. . . in a tone of voice and general manner which must be characterized as surly, defiant,
and contemptuous"); Parmelee Transp. Co., 292 F.2d at 809 (certification stated that "Lee A.
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sions, physical gestures, and/or tone of voice,2 2 ° there is no way of test-
ing the accuracy of the facts as to the possibility either of misperception
or biased interpretation by the trial judge.22 1 Moreover, unlike the re-
view of other kinds of trials where the trial judge is the fact-finder, in
summary contempt cases there is almost always a real potential for bias
on the part of the judge.22 2 Although the record will occasionally
demonstrate judicial bias sufficient to raise some question as to the im-
partiality of the judge, or even to require a remand for a new hearing
before a different court, appellate courts ordinarily would have no way,
short of such evidence, of testing the accuracy of the trial judge's
findings.223
In any event, where the trial record does not adequately disclose the
specific facts that demonstrate a contempt was committed, as opposed to
the judge's conclusions, the appellate court should be scrupulous in re-
versing the conviction.224 Where the record reflects the trial judge's
statements regarding facts not otherwise appearing on the record, such as
physical gestures or tone of voice, something more should be required
than the mere recitation by the trial court of such facts. In those circum-
stances, appellate courts should insist upon some indication in the con-
temporaneous transcript that the gestures occurred, such as warnings by
Freeman conducted himself in a contumacious manner by employing a tone of voice and an
attitude indicating contempt and defiance of the Court, by sneering and laughing").
220. See, e.g., Rollerson v. United States, 343 F.2d 269, 276-77 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (contempt
consisted of throwing water pitcher at prosecutor); United States v. Hall, 176 F.2d 163, 165-69
(2d Cir.) (shouting at judge in loud, angry voices), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 851 (1949); Comstock
v. United States, 419 F.2d 1128, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 1969) (contemnor failed to rise and ap-
proach bench after being ordered to do so); In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416 (body
language and laughter showed disrespect for court); In re Hallinan, 71 Cal. 2d 1179, 1180 n.2,
459 P.2d 255, 256 n.2, 81 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 n.2 (1969) (sarcastic tone of voice and disrespectful
gestures).
221. See supra note 208.
222. See, e.g., Sacher, 343 U.S. at 12 ("It is almost inevitable that any contempt of a court
committed in the presence of the judge during a trial will be an offense against his dignity and
authority.").
223. This is another reason that de novo review is not only preferable to an abuse of discre-
tion standard, but is necessary in summary contempt cases. Moreover, de novo review pro-
vides a much greater opportunity for testing the trial judge's perceptions for mistake and bias
through supplementation of the appellate record. Of course, an appellate court can also sup-
plement the record when reviewing under a discretionary standard. The court rules of most
jurisdictions permit supplementation of the appellate record when a party questions whether
the record fully discloses what occurred in the court below. See N.J. COURT RULE 2:5-5
(1983). Even in jurisdictions that apply an abuse of discretion standard, perhaps the appellate
court should permit a supplementation of the record if the defendant can demonstrate bias, but
certainly the court's authority to do so is greater when the standard of review is de novo.
224. See Tauber v. Gordon, 350 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1965); In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230
(1962); Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1961).
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the judge to cease, 2 2 or an apology by the contemnor admitting an angry
tone of voice.226 In the absence of these kinds of objective indicia that
the challenged expressions in fact happened, contempt convictions would
be rendered unassailable on appeal by the trial court's sheer certification
of such conduct.
227
As noted earlier, de novo review will only serve to cure the due
process violations of summary hearings to the extent that the factual rec-
ord is supplemented whenever the trial court's findings of fact are insuffi-
cient for the appellate court to discharge its responsibilities of de novo
review. This insufficiency occurs when the trial court's findings of fact
are contested and the contemnor did not have a full opportunity to pres-
ent a defense before an impartial fact-finder below. The record may be
supplemented either by an appellate court remanding the matter to a trial
court, other than the one in which the contempt arose, to conduct a sup-
plemental factual hearing and make findings of fact,228 by an appellate
225. See, eg., In re Hallinan, 71 Cal. 2d 1179, 1184, 459 P.2d 255, 258, 81 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5
(1969) (if words used by counsel are not disrespectful, court must warn attorney that his tone
and facial expressions are offensive before charging the attorney with contempt); In re Daniels,
118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416 (trial judge warned contemnor on the record the previous day that if
he continued to manifest outward disapproval of the court's rulings, he would hold him in
contempt and put him in jail), cert denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3326 (1990); Sacher, 343 U.S. at 10-11
(trial judge's repeated warnings to counsel demonstrated his "well-considered" judgment.).
The value of prior warnings by the judge as an indication of the accuracy of the court's
characterization of the conduct contained in the warning depends in large part on the contem-
nor's acquiescence in the charge. To some degree, a contemnor's failure to refute the judge's
characterization could be taken as a concession or admission. Even where the contemnor
immediately refutes the court's characterization of her conduct, the court's contemporaneous
characterization still has some value in assessing the reliability of the judge, at least to the
extent that it demonstrates that the judge believed the conduct took place at that time. But
where the contemnor objects to the court's characterization of her conduct, and especially
where other witnesses in the courtroom join in her disagreement with the court's characteriza-
tion, it is an indication that the appellate court should proceed more carefully, either by re-
manding for plenary proceedings or, at the least, supplementing the trial record with an
evidentiary hearing. See infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
226. See, eg., In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416 (contemnor apologized but denied
court's characterization of his behavior); In re McDonald, 819 F.2d 1020, 1025 (11th Cir.
1987) (contemnor's justification-". . . and that's why I did it"-relied on by court as admis-
sion of a willful violation of court order); In re Halinan, 71 Cal. 2d 1179, 459 P.2d 255, 81
Cal. Rptr. I (attorney apologized for sarcastic remarks made to judge but not those made to
witness).
227. See, eg., In reHallinan, 71 Cal. 2d at 1182, 459 P.2d at 257, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 3 ("If a
trial judge had only to state that a contemnor raised his voice and twisted his features, no
contempt order could be attacked."). Of course, even if the contemnor did make disrespectful
gestures or used a sarcastic tone of voice, the conduct is not necessarily obstructive or con-
temptuous. See Raveson, supra note 18, at 778-85.
228. This supplemental hearing would be conducted purely for the purpose of finding facts
that the appellate court could consider in its independent review, and should not be confused
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court itself hearing either testimonial or documentary evidence,229 or by
the filing of testimonial affidavits with the appellate court.230 Often,
where the contempt citation is the result of unambiguous language on the
record that constitutes an obstruction by itself, no supplemental hearing
may be necessary.231
III. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has failed to deal adequately with the summary
criminal contempt power. Although the Court has in the past imposed
some limitations on the exercise and substantive scope of the power,232 it
has more recently retreated from the prior sensitivity to the potential for
abuse of the power reflected in its earlier opinions.233 Against calls for
abolition and cutting reform of a court's power to inflict immediate pun-
ishment for conduct it perceives as obstructive, a single argument has
prevailed: the power is necessary to a court's ability to prevent interfer-
ence with its business. Once it is accepted that the courts must have the
power to impose immediate sanctions, the rationale for dispensing with
ordinary due process protections, that the judge has witnessed all of the
relevant events, can be asserted with relative ease. Grounded upon these
with a remand for a plenary contempt proceeding in which the court would have the power to
re-adjudicate the contempt.
229. Although this is one available alternative, it should not be the preferred method be-
cause it is not within the appellate court's realm of expertise to sift through evidence and make
factual and credibility determinations itself. Trial courts, on the other hand, have vast experi-
ence in making findings of fact after evidentiary hearings.
In New Jersey, where a court engaging in de novo review of a contempt conviction deems
the factual record inadequate, the most common practice is to remand the matter to a trial
court for a supplemental evidentiary hearing. See In re Lependorf, 212 N.J. Super. 284, 514
A.2d 1335 (App. Div. 1986); In re Daniels, 118 N.J. 51, 570 A.2d 416. The appellate court,
however, has also accepted the submission of witness affidavits on behalf of the contemnor
attesting to their observations of the contemnor's conduct. Id
230. Despite the fact that affidavits are by their very nature hearsay, some courts have
relied upon them as one means of supplementing the record. Although this practice may not
present a serious problem when the affidavits are sworn statements of the contemnor or the
contemnor's witnesses, affidavits submitted by the state present a Confrontation Clause prob-
lem as well. See 4 LOUISELL & MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 410-18 (1981).
231. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Accord, Note, Direct Criminal Contempt:
An Analysis of Due Process and Jury Trial Rights, 11 NEw ENG. L. REv. 77, 82 (1975)
(although United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309 (1975) is distinguishable on its facts, it may
represent a step back from the Court's earlier cases); Recent Development, Summary Con-
tempt May Properly Be Applied to the Orderly Refusal of Witnesses to Testify at Trial After
Grant of Immunity-United States v. Wilson, 421 US. 309 (1975), 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
271, 280 (1975) (authored by Robert L. Wyld); United States v. Wilson: An Expansive Ap-
proach to the Power of the Federal Courts to Punish Contempts Under Rule 42(a) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 9 Sw. U.L. REv. 747, 757-78 (1977) (authored by Scott Jacobs).
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two justifications, the summary contempt power has had a long history
of abuse and surely has resulted in the substantial self-censorship of vig-
orous advocacy.
Despite the many compelling voices to the contrary, there is little
question, at least in the foreseeable future, that the summary contempt
power will remain as one of the most anomalous features of our justice
system. Perhaps it is simply too unrealistic to expect courts to curtail
their own age-old prerogatives. This is especially so because almost all of
the suggestions for limitations of the summary contempt power have
struck at its very core, the necessity and authority for immediate action,
by arguing for the reintroduction of the very due process rights that must
be abridged for the contempt power to be exercised summarily.
2 34
However, the authority to act without delay can be preserved at the
same time as an alleged contemnor's due process rights are given far
greater protection than at present, by acknowledging, or at least tolerat-
ing, the courts' perception of their need for immediate action in the trial
court, and providing expanded due process protections in appeals of con-
tempt convictions. As demonstrated in this Article, this can be achieved
without any diminishment of the courts' power by subjecting such ap-
peals to a de novo standard of review. At its heart, this recommendation
rejects the fiction, once a contempt conviction is on appeal and it is no
longer critical to the trial court's ability to maintain order, that the trial
judge's observation of the events in question obviates the need for funda-
mental due process protections. By providing greater procedural due
process in the appellate courts, de novo review holds the promise for
significantly reducing the deterrent effect of the contempt power through
the guarantee of fundamental fairness to the contemnor in the adjudica-
tion of the contempt and facilitation of the development of appropriate
limits on the substantive scope of the power.
234. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.

